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Abstract:	  Hume	  has	  no	  theory	  of	  sovereignty.	  As	  a	  result	  he	  is	  frequently	  supposed	  to	  lack	  a	  proper	  theory	  of	  politics,	  providing	  only	  a	  political	  sociology	  incapable	  of	  addressing	  the	  central	  normative	  significance	  of	  political	  obligation	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  modern	  state.	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  mistake.	  Hume	  addressed	  himself	  directly	  to	  the	  question	  of	  political	  obligation,	  but	  his	  argument	  was	  predicated	  upon	  a	  prior	  reconfiguration	  of	  our	  thinking	  about	  the	  nature,	  role,	  and	  power	  of	  philosophy.	  In	  coming	  to	  appreciate	  this	  prior	  reconfiguration,	  in	  particular	  via	  a	  re-­‐examination	  of	  Hume's	  indirect	  engagement	  with	  Locke's	  earlier	  juridical	  political	  theory,	  we	  can	  properly	  appreciate	  Hume	  as	  advancing	  a	  radically	  innovative	  theory	  of	  political	  obligation.	  What	  emerges	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  without	  sovereignty.	  As	  well	  as	  thereby	  revealing	  Hume	  to	  be	  a	  major	  and	  highly	  original	  post-­‐Hobbesian	  theorist	  of	  the	  state,	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  consider	  whether	  present	  political	  theory	  would	  do	  better	  by	  adopting	  Hume's	  recommended	  philosophical	  reconceptualization.	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Introduction	  
	  Hume	  has	  no	  theory	  of	  sovereignty.	  By	  extension,	  he	  offers	  no	  attempt	  to	  explain	  political	  obligation	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  rulers	  are	  justified	  in	  expecting	  (and	  if	  necessary,	  extracting)	  from	  the	  ruled,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  particular	  kind	  of	  relationship	  they	  stand	  in	  towards	  them	  as	  rulers.	  Instead,	  Hume’s	  analysis	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focuses	  upon	  the	  ruled	  themselves	  –	  the	  bearers	  of	  the	  ‘opinion	  of	  mankind’	  –	  and	  the	  psychological	  processes	  by	  which	  they	  believe	  themselves	  bound	  by	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  superiors,	  whom	  they	  always	  outnumber	  but	  nonetheless	  typically	  obey.3	  Because	  of	  this	  it	  may	  appear	  that	  Hume	  fails	  to	  offer	  a	  political	  theory	  proper,	  providing	  only	  a	  political	  sociology	  which	  is	  incapable	  of	  adequately	  addressing,	  let	  alone	  answering,	  the	  problem	  of	  political	  obligation:	  of	  why	  obedience	  is	  owed	  to	  established	  power,	  and	  why	  such	  power	  may	  legitimately	  coerce	  those	  who	  disobey	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  possession	  of	  supreme	  rightful	  authority	  –	  that	  is,	  sovereignty.4	  Political	  obligation	  is	  one	  of,	  if	  not	  the,	  central	  problems	  of	  western	  political	  theory.	  If	  it	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  accounted	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  all	  other	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  the	  state,	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  organised	  coercive	  power,	  is	  jeopardized.5	  The	  earliest	  investigation	  in	  the	  western	  tradition	  (far	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  modern	  state,	  but	  addressing	  the	  same	  fundamental	  issue)	  is	  Plato’s	  Crito.	  In	  this	  dialogue	  Socrates	  famously	  refuses	  to	  flee	  Athens	  after	  being	  condemned	  to	  execution,	  citing	  a	  duty	  of	  gratitude	  and	  obligation	  to	  the	  city	  as	  like	  a	  parent	  that	  has	  nurtured	  him,	  to	  which	  he	  has	  previously	  consented,	  and	  which	  must	  therefore	  be	  obeyed	  even	  when	  putting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  David	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  first	  principles	  of	  government’,	  in	  Essays	  Moral,	  Political	  and	  Literary,	  ed.	  E.F.	  Miller	  (Indianapolis,	  1987),	  pp.	  32-­‐6,	  pp.	  32-­‐3.	  4	  For	  the	  view	  that	  Hume	  lacks	  a	  proper	  political	  theory	  see	  in	  particular	  John	  Dunn,	  ‘From	  applied	  theology	  to	  social	  analysis:	  the	  break	  between	  John	  Locke	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Enlightenment’,	  in	  Wealth	  and	  Virtue:	  The	  Shaping	  of	  Political	  Economy	  in	  the	  Scottish	  
Enlightenment,	  ed.	  I.	  Hont	  and	  M.	  Ignatieff	  (Cambridge,	  1983),	  pp.	  119-­‐35.	  See	  also	  P.F.	  Brownsey,	  ‘Hume	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract’,	  The	  Philosophical	  Quarterly	  28	  (1978),	  pp.	  132-­‐48,	  pp.	  142-­‐3.	  5	  Recent	  treatments	  that	  have	  emphasized	  the	  centrality	  of	  political	  obligation	  to	  political	  theory	  include	  Robert	  Nozick,	  Anarchy,	  State,	  and	  Utopia	  (Oxford,	  1974);	  Carole	  Pateman,	  The	  Problem	  of	  
Political	  Obligation:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  Liberal	  Theory	  (Chichester,	  1979);	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  
Moral	  Principles	  and	  Political	  Obligation	  (Princeton	  N.J.,	  1979);	  the	  essays	  collected	  in	  John	  Dunn,	  
Political	  Obligation	  in	  its	  Historical	  Context	  (Cambridge,	  1980);	  John	  Horton,	  Political	  Obligation	  (Basingstoke,	  2010).	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him	  to	  death.6	  Few	  have	  been	  convinced	  by	  that	  answer	  in	  the	  two	  and	  a	  half	  millennia	  since,	  whilst	  the	  problem	  takes	  on	  new	  forms	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  state:	  its	  scale,	  anonymity,	  territorial	  ubiquity,	  and	  capacity	  for	  coercive	  power	  and	  control	  pushing	  a	  Platonic	  city-­‐parent	  analogy	  even	  further	  beyond	  breaking	  point.7	  	  In	  the	  modern	  context,	  Hobbes	  remains	  a	  particularly	  illuminating	  author	  –	  even	  if	  only	  because	  his	  parsimonious	  attempt	  to	  settle	  matters	  could	  not	  evade	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  problem.	  For	  Hobbes,	  that	  individual	  or	  assembly	  possessing	  sovereignty	  had	  not	  just	  supreme	  power,	  but	  legitimate	  authority	  to	  use	  coercive	  power	  to	  enforce	  obedience.	  Hobbes’s	  claim	  was	  never	  that	  might	  made	  right.	  Sovereignty	  was	  generated	  by	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled,	  even	  if	  extracted	  at	  the	  point	  of	  a	  sword.8	  Being	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  sovereignty,	  consent	  was	  thus	  also	  the	  foundation	  of	  political	  obligation:	  one	  was	  obliged	  to	  that	  power	  one	  had	  consented	  to	  be	  sovereign,	  and	  could	  be	  legitimately	  coerced	  by	  that	  power	  to	  ensure	  obedience	  (that	  of	  oneself,	  and	  others).	  Everyone	  within	  an	  established	  commonwealth	  consented,	  everyone	  was	  obliged,	  and	  hence	  everyone	  could	  be	  legitimately	  coerced,	  even	  if	  a	  residual	  right	  to	  resist	  wounds	  and	  death	  remained.	  Yet	  this	  parsimonious	  account	  of	  the	  grounds	  of	  sovereignty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Plato,	  Euthyphro.	  Apology.	  Crito.	  Phaedo.	  Phaedrus,	  ed.	  H.	  North	  Fowler	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  1982),	  pp.	  175-­‐191.	  Hume	  describes	  the	  Crito	  as	  building	  a	  Tory	  doctrine	  of	  passive	  obedience	  on	  a	  Whig	  principle	  of	  original	  contract,	  and	  emphasises	  that	  because	  eighteenth	  century	  doctrines	  of	  authority	  as	  founded	  in	  consent	  have	  no	  historical	  precedent,	  this	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  against	  their	  being	  true:	  ‘Of	  the	  original	  contract’,	  in	  Essays,	  pp.	  465-­‐87,	  p.	  487.	  7	  Adam	  Smith	  adapted	  Plato’s	  ‘divine	  maxim’	  that	  one	  was	  made	  for	  the	  state	  and	  not	  the	  reverse,	  and	  should	  no	  more	  harm	  the	  state	  than	  one’s	  parent,	  but	  this	  presupposed	  a	  post-­‐Humean	  innovation	  regarding	  the	  nature	  and	  content	  of	  political	  authority.	  See	  Istvan	  Hont,	  ‘Commercial	  Society	  and	  Political	  Theory	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Century:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Authority	  in	  David	  Hume	  and	  Adam	  Smith’,	  in	  Main	  Trends	  in	  Cultural	  History:	  Ten	  Essays,	  ed.	  W.	  Melching	  and	  W.	  Velema,	  (Amsterdam,	  1994),	  pp.	  54-­‐94,	  p.	  89.	  	  8	  Hence	  Hobbes’s	  dictum	  that	  ‘It	  is	  not	  therefore	  the	  victory	  that	  giveth	  the	  right	  of	  dominion	  over	  the	  vanquished,	  but	  his	  own	  covenant’:	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  The	  Clarendon	  Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  of	  
Thomas	  Hobbes:	  Leviathan,	  3	  vols.,	  ed.	  Noel	  Malcolm	  (Oxford,	  2012),	  II,	  p.	  312.	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and	  obligation	  ran	  into	  difficulty	  when	  consent	  and	  power	  came	  apart.	  What	  if	  a	  sovereign,	  previously	  consented	  to,	  lost	  power	  to	  unlawful,	  but	  successful,	  rebels?	  If	  unable	  to	  protect,	  because	  no	  longer	  wielding	  the	  public	  sword	  keeping	  men	  in	  awe,	  such	  a	  sovereign	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  sovereign.	  To	  whom,	  then,	  was	  obedience	  owed,	  and	  why?	  Individual	  judgement,	  which	  Hobbes	  saw	  as	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  interminable	  strife	  and	  quarrel,	  and	  which	  he	  therefore	  sought	  to	  entirely	  exclude,	  reappeared	  at	  precisely	  the	  point	  where	  political	  obligation	  was	  an	  issue	  with	  more	  than	  just	  theoretical	  import.9	  	  Hobbes’s	  ambiguity	  in	  addressing	  political	  obligation	  at	  its	  limit	  has	  rightly	  attracted	  much	  scholarly	  attention.10	  But	  I	  will	  not	  address	  that	  vexed	  matter	  here.	  I	  wish	  merely	  to	  note	  that	  if	  political	  obligation	  is	  indeed	  a	  central	  item	  in	  western	  political	  theory,	  umbilically	  connected	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  (as	  exemplified	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	  a	  discussion	  see	  Kinch	  Hoekstra,	  ‘Tyrannus	  Rex	  vs.	  Leviathan’,	  Pacific	  Philosophical	  
Quarterly	  82	  (2001),	  pp.	  420-­‐46.	  As	  Hoekstra	  concludes	  (p.	  438):	  ‘Though	  he	  strives	  to	  minimize	  its	  role,	  Hobbes	  must	  recognize	  that	  private	  judgment	  is	  ineliminable.	  The	  very	  feet	  of	  his	  great	  Leviathan	  are	  of	  mortal	  clay’.	  	  	  10	  This	  focuses	  not	  just	  on	  the	  contents	  of	  his	  theory	  and	  whether	  he	  was	  a	  royalist,	  a	  ‘de	  facto’	  theorist,	  or	  a	  theorist	  of	  consent,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  addition	  of	  ‘A	  review,	  and	  conclusion’	  to	  
Leviathan	  with	  its	  ‘twentieth’	  law	  of	  nature	  that	  men	  are	  to	  defend	  in	  times	  of	  war	  that	  power	  which	  protected	  them	  in	  time	  of	  peace.	  There	  is	  also	  Hobbes’s	  returning	  to	  England	  in	  1650	  and	  submitting	  himself	  to	  the	  new	  regime,	  which	  had	  overthrown	  a	  monarchy	  Hobbes	  was	  unequivocal	  in	  maintaining	  had	  held	  rightful	  ‘sovereignty	  from	  a	  descent	  of	  six	  hundred	  years	  was	  alone	  called	  sovereign,	  had	  the	  title	  of	  Majesty	  from	  every	  one	  of	  his	  subjects,	  and	  was	  unquestionably	  taken	  by	  them	  for	  their	  king’:	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  II,	  p.	  286.	  For	  discussions	  of	  Hobbes’s	  theory	  of	  political	  obligation,	  see	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  ‘The	  Context	  of	  Hobbes’s	  Theory	  of	  Political	  Obligation’,	  and	  ‘Conquest	  and	  Consent:	  Hobbes	  and	  the	  Engagement	  Controversy’,	  in	  
Visions	  of	  Politics:	  Volume	  3,	  Hobbes	  (Cambridge,	  2002);	  ‘Historical	  introduction’,	  in	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  The	  Clarendon	  edition	  of	  the	  works	  of	  Thomas	  Hobbes:	  Writings	  on	  the	  common	  law	  and	  
hereditary	  right,	  ed.	  A.	  Cromartie	  and	  Q.	  Skinner	  (Oxford,	  2005),	  pp.	  159-­‐76;	  Kinch	  Hoekstra,	  ‘The	  
de	  facto	  turn	  in	  Hobbes’s	  political	  philosophy’,	  in	  Leviathan	  after	  350	  Years,	  ed.	  T.	  Sorell	  and	  L.	  Foisneau	  (Oxford,	  2004),	  pp.	  33-­‐74;	  Jeffrey	  R.	  Collins,	  The	  Allegiance	  of	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  (Oxford,	  2005);	  Mary	  G.	  Dietz,	  ‘Hobbes’s	  Subject	  as	  Citizen’,	  in	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  and	  Political	  Theory,	  ed.	  M.G.	  Dietz	  (Lawrence,	  1990),	  pp.	  91-­‐119;	  Howard	  Warrender,	  The	  Political	  Philosophy	  of	  Hobbes:	  
His	  Theory	  of	  Obligation	  (Oxford,	  1957);	  Annabel	  Brett,	  Liberty,	  Right	  and	  Nature:	  Individual	  
Rights	  in	  Later	  Scholastic	  Thought	  (Cambridge,	  1997),	  chapter	  6;	  Changes	  of	  State:	  Nature	  and	  the	  
Limits	  of	  the	  City	  in	  Early	  Modern	  Natural	  Law	  (Princeton,	  2011),	  pp.	  108-­‐14.	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Hobbes),	  then	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Hume	  disabled	  himself	  from	  addressing	  this	  issue	  due	  to	  the	  mode	  of	  his	  political	  enquiry	  should	  be,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  deeply	  surprising.	  Hume	  was	  a	  political	  thinker	  of	  the	  utmost	  genius	  and	  seriousness,	  whilst	  his	  status	  as	  a	  philosopher	  of	  epistemological,	  metaphysical,	  and	  moral	  matters	  is	  in	  doubt	  by	  nobody.	  Is	  it	  plausible	  to	  suppose	  that	  he	  nonetheless	  failed	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  outstanding	  item	  of	  concern	  in	  western	  political	  thought?	  I	  suggest	  not.	  We	  must	  instead	  come	  to	  see	  Hume’s	  project	  as	  attempting	  a	  fundamental	  recasting	  of	  how	  to	  think	  about	  both	  the	  status	  of	  philosophy	  as	  an	  enterprise	  with	  practical	  political	  import,	  and	  what	  we	  can	  coherently	  hope	  and	  expect	  from	  any	  notion	  of	  political	  obligation	  appropriate	  to	  a	  secular	  world.	  Hume	  understood	  very	  well	  the	  centrality	  of	  political	  obligation	  to	  our	  thinking	  about	  politics.	  His	  aim	  was	  to	  change	  our	  thinking.	  The	  central	  and	  most	  instructive	  comparison	  to	  be	  drawn	  is	  between	  Hume	  and	  the	  political	  thought	  of	  John	  Locke.	  This	  is	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  Locke	  (or	  at	  least,	  a	  secularized	  and	  vulgarized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  ideas)	  is	  Hume’s	  primary	  confrontation	  point	  in	  the	  Treatise,	  which	  remains	  the	  site	  of	  Hume’s	  most	  fundamental	  engagement	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  political	  obligation.11	  Secondly,	  lying	  beneath	  Hume’s	  direct	  arguments	  against	  contract	  theory	  is	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  later	  essay	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’	  restates	  much	  of	  Hume’s	  position	  in	  the	  Treatise,	  but	  largely	  assumes,	  without	  explicit	  statement,	  Hume’s	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	  philosophy	  for	  its	  coherence.	  To	  properly	  appreciate	  that	  reconfiguration,	  and	  hence	  Hume’s	  thought	  as	  a	  whole,	  we	  must	  concentrate	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  Treatise,	  where	  Hume	  delineates	  the	  foundations	  of	  his	  philosophical	  approach.	  For	  the	  context	  of	  Hume’s	  attack	  on	  contract	  theory	  see	  Duncan	  Forbes,	  Hume’s	  Philosophical	  Politics,	  (Cambridge,	  1975),	  chapters	  3,	  5	  and	  6;	  Stephen	  Buckle	  and	  Dario	  Castiglione,	  ‘Hume’s	  Critique	  of	  the	  Contract	  Theory’,	  History	  of	  
Political	  Thought	  12	  (1991),	  pp.	  457-­‐80.	  For	  discussions	  of	  Hume’s	  theory	  of	  allegiance	  and	  his	  attack	  on	  contract	  theory	  see	  Rachel	  Cohon,	  ‘The	  Shackles	  of	  Virtue:	  Hume	  on	  Allegiance	  to	  Government’,	  History	  of	  Philosophy	  Quarterly	  18	  (2001),	  pp.	  393-­‐414;	  Frederick	  G.	  Whelan,	  ‘Hume	  and	  Contractarianism’,	  Polity	  27	  (1994),	  pp.	  201-­‐224;	  Thomas	  W.	  Merrill,	  ‘The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Rebellion	  in	  Hume’s	  Constitutional	  Thought’,	  The	  Review	  of	  Politics	  67	  (2005),	  pp.	  257-­‐82;	  David	  Gauthier,	  ‘David	  Hume,	  Contractarian’,	  The	  Philosophical	  Review	  88	  (1979),	  pp.	  3-­‐38.	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attempted	  reconfiguration	  of	  what	  political	  philosophy	  can	  hope	  to	  achieve,	  and	  of	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  political	  obligation	  can	  and	  should	  be	  conceptualized.	  Istvan	  Hont	  has	  identified	  that	  Hume,	  like	  his	  friend	  and	  philosophical	  successor	  Adam	  Smith,	  objected	  to	  Locke	  not	  on	  the	  principle	  (to	  employ	  Smith’s	  later	  terminology)	  of	  ‘utility’,	  but	  of	  ‘authority’.12	  Utility	  related	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  a	  governed	  populace:	  ‘Salus	  Populi	  Suprema	  Lex	  is	  certainly	  so	  just	  and	  fundamental	  a	  Rule,	  that	  he,	  who	  sincerely	  follows	  it,	  cannot	  dangerously	  err’	  wrote	  Locke.13	  	  Hume	  and	  Smith	  did	  not	  disagree.	  Government	  was	  legitimate	  only	  so	  long	  as	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  people	  was	  in	  practice,	  and	  not	  just	  in	  theory,	  the	  supreme	  law.14	  But	  Hume	  and	  Smith	  could	  not	  accept	  Locke’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  ‘authority’	  of	  present	  government	  –	  by	  which	  it	  could	  rightfully	  claim,	  and	  if	  necessary,	  coercively	  extract,	  obedience	  –	  was	  founded	  upon	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled.	   Hont	  writes	  that	  Hume	  ‘doggedly	  tried	  to	  develop	  a	  rounded	  theory	  of	  political	  allegiance	  with	  a	  proper	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  authority’	  in	  the	  
Treatise	  of	  Human	  Nature,	  political	  Essays,	  and	  A	  History	  of	  England.	  Still,	  he	  does	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Adam	  Smith,	  The	  Glasgow	  Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  and	  Correspondence,	  Volume	  5:	  Lectures	  on	  
Jurisprudence,	  ed.	  R.L.	  Meek,	  D.D.	  Raphael	  and	  P.G.	  Stein	  (Indianapolis,	  1982),	  pp.	  318-­‐21,	  401-­‐3;	  Istvan	  Hont,	  ‘Adam	  Smith’s	  History	  of	  Law	  and	  Government	  as	  Political	  Theory’,	  in	  Political	  
judgement:	  Essays	  for	  John	  Dunn,	  ed.	  R.	  Bourke	  and	  R.	  Geuss	  (Cambridge,	  2009),	  pp.	  131-­‐71,	  p.	  139.	  13	  John	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  ed.	  P.	  Laslett	  (Cambridge,	  1960),	  p.	  373,	  §158.	  As	  Hume	  later	  put	  it,	  ‘The	  maxim,	  fiat	  Justitia	  &	  ruat	  Cœlum,	  let	  justice	  be	  performed,	  though	  the	  universe	  be	  destroyed,	  is	  apparently	  false,	  and	  by	  sacrificing	  the	  end	  to	  the	  means,	  shews	  a	  preposterous	  idea	  of	  the	  subordination	  of	  duties’,	  whereas	  ‘Salus	  populi,	  suprema	  Lex,	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  people	  is	  the	  supreme	  law’	  is	  a	  ‘maxim…agreeable	  to	  the	  sentiments	  of	  mankind	  in	  all	  ages’:	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  passive	  obedience’,	  in	  Essays,	  pp.	  488-­‐92,	  p.	  489;	  cf.	  David	  Hume,	  The	  Clarendon	  
Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  of	  David	  Hume:	  An	  Enquiry	  Concerning	  the	  Principles	  of	  Morals,	  ed.	  T.L.	  Beauchamp	  (Oxford,	  1998),	  p.	  22.	  14	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  how	  Hume	  and	  (especially)	  Smith	  positioned	  themselves	  on	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  principles	  of	  salus	  populi	  and	  fiat	  justitia	  in	  political	  practice,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  intellectual	  inheritance	  from	  an	  earlier	  natural	  law	  tradition,	  see	  Istvan	  Hont,	  ‘Needs	  and	  Justice	  in	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations’,	  in	  Jealousy	  of	  Trade:	  International	  Competition	  and	  
the	  Nation	  State	  in	  Historical	  Perspective	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  2005),	  pp.	  389-­‐443,	  especially	  pp.	  412-­‐9.	  
	  	   7	  
not	  identify	  Hume	  as	  fully	  engaging	  with	  the	  Lockean	  challenge	  regarding	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  authority.	  Instead	  it	  is	  Smith,	  in	  his	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government,	  who	  ‘went	  even	  further	  than	  Hume	  in	  this	  direction	  and	  made	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  a	  new	  principle	  of	  authority	  the	  central	  task	  of	  post-­‐Lockean	  political	  theory’.15	  Yet	  this	  assessment	  faces	  a	  serious	  difficulty.	  How	  can	  a	  
history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  normative	  problem	  of	  why	  some	  agent	  or	  agents	  hold	  authority,	  thus	  obligating	  others	  and	  generating	  a	  condition	  of	  political	  obedience	  which	  can	  be	  coercively	  enforced?	  Despite	  Hont’s	  insistence	  that	  ‘Secular	  political	  theorists	  can	  lose	  nothing	  and	  stand	  to	  gain	  a	  great	  deal	  both	  by	  taking	  Smith	  seriously	  as	  a	  political	  thinker	  and	  by	  abandoning	  the	  attempt	  to	  try	  to	  pigeon-­‐hole	  his	  work	  as	  mere	  historical	  sociology’,	  the	  reader	  is	  left	  wanting.16	  Hont’s	  claim	  that	  Smith	  offered	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  natural	  authority	  enabling	  us	  to	  progress	  beyond	  the	  theistic	  basis	  of	  Locke’s	  thought	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  an	  inadequate	  Hobbesian	  prudentialism	  on	  the	  other,	  is	  left	  at	  the	  level	  of	  a	  promise	  not	  made	  good	  on,	  his	  magisterial	  reconstruction	  of	  Smith’s	  account	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  modern	  liberty	  notwithstanding.17	  And	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  that	  promise	  could	  be	  made	  good	  on,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  terms	  Hont	  presents.	  For	  a	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  to	  become	  a	  political	  theory	  capable	  of	  explaining	  the	  normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  History	  of	  Law	  and	  Government’,	  p.	  141.	  Hont	  outlines	  Smith’s	  ‘sociological’	  account	  of	  authority,	  and	  the	  practical	  political	  consequences	  of	  understanding	  it	  in	  those	  terms	  (especially	  in	  opposition	  to	  both	  French	  physiocracy	  and	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  systematizing	  zeal)	  in	  Hont,	  ‘Commercial	  Society	  and	  Political	  theory’,	  pp.	  86-­‐91.	  16	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  p.	  168.	  17	  On	  the	  effort	  to	  progress	  beyond	  Hobbes	  without	  resort	  to	  theistic	  foundations	  see	  John	  Dunn,	  ‘The	  Politics	  of	  Imponderable	  and	  Potentially	  Lethal	  Judgement	  for	  Mortals:	  Hobbes’s	  Legacy	  for	  the	  Understanding	  of	  Modern	  Politics’,	  in	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  ed.	  I.	  Shapiro	  (New	  Haven,	  2010).	  Dunn	  himself	  attempted	  to	  provide	  a	  secular	  alternative	  to	  Locke	  and	  Hobbes	  in	  ‘Political	  Obligations	  and	  Political	  Possibilities’,	  in	  Political	  Obligation	  in	  its	  Historical	  Contexts:	  Essays	  in	  
Political	  Theory	  (Cambridge,	  1980),	  though	  by	  his	  own	  admission	  the	  attempt	  is	  unsuccessful.	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content	  of	  authority,	  some	  normative	  account	  must	  ultimately	  be	  offered.	  History	  alone	  cannot	  supply	  that:	  political	  theory	  needs	  philosophy.	  Without	  it,	  Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  can	  offer	  only	  an	  interesting	  dead	  end.	  Yet	  what	  if	  Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  is	  not	  best	  taken	  as	  a	  freestanding	  intervention,	  but	  presupposes	  a	  prior	  reconfiguration	  of	  our	  philosophical	  thinking	  on	  the	  question	  of	  authority?	  That	  is	  the	  suggestion	  I	  wish	  to	  advance.	  That	  Smith	  did	  not,	  as	  Hont	  suggests,	  go	  ‘even	  further’	  than	  Hume,	  but	  rather	  was	  expanding	  the	  analysis	  within	  a	  new	  philosophical	  idiom	  forged	  
by	  Hume,	  supplied	  most	  clearly	  in	  the	  Treatise,	  and	  which	  Smith	  presupposed	  as	  the	  normative	  philosophical	  background	  for	  his	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  as	  political	  theory.	  To	  see	  this,	  however,	  we	  must	  first	  turn	  to	  Locke	  in	  some	  detail,	  and	  I	  beg	  the	  reader’s	  patience	  in	  this	  matter.	  For	  it	  is	  only	  after	  properly	  examining	  the	  foundations	  of	  Locke’s	  theory	  of	  authority	  that	  we	  can	  examine	  Hume’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  problem	  from	  a	  vantage	  point	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  appreciate	  its	  considerable	  philosophical	  profundity	  and	  ambition.	  
I	  –	  Locke’s	  Two	  Frameworks:	  Juridical	  and	  Historical	  As	  is	  now	  well	  recognised	  Locke’s	  political	  thought	  is	  irreducibly	  theistic.18	  His	  central	  premise	  was	  that	  all	  human	  beings	  are	  created	  equal	  by	  God,	  with	  their	  natural	  condition	  being	  one	  wherein	  ‘all	  the	  Power	  and	  Jurisdiction	  is	  reciprocal,	  no	  one	  having	  more	  than	  another’,	  meaning	  all	  are	  ‘equal	  one	  amongst	  another	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  classic	  statement	  remains	  John	  Dunn,	  The	  Political	  Thought	  of	  John	  Locke:	  An	  Historical	  
Account	  of	  the	  ‘Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government’	  (Cambridge,	  1969).	  See	  also	  John	  Dunn,	  ‘What	  is	  living	  and	  What	  is	  Dead	  in	  the	  Political	  Theory	  of	  John	  Locke?’,	  in	  Interpreting	  Political	  
Responsibility:	  Essays	  1981-­‐89,	  (Padstow,	  1990);	  David	  Gauthier,	  ‘Why	  Ought	  One	  Obey	  God?	  Reflections	  on	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke’,	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  7	  (1997),	  pp.	  425-­‐46,	  especially	  p.	  432.	  
	  	   9	  
without	  Subordination	  or	  Subjection’.19	  	  Some	  could	  obtain	  political	  authority	  over	  others	  only	  if	  those	  who	  became	  subordinate	  agreed	  to	  this	  change	  of	  affairs.	  Just	  as	  each	  individual’s	  own	  body	  was	  only	  on	  loan	  from	  its	  maker	  –	  meaning	  suicide,	  as	  much	  as	  harm	  to	  others,	  was	  naturally	  outlawed	  –	  so	  no	  person	  could	  come	  to	  have	  legitimate	  temporal	  political	  authority	  without	  this	  ultimately	  being	  divinely	  sanctioned.20	  Such	  sanction	  came	  not	  through	  any	  act	  of	  intervention	  by	  God,	  but	  by	  the	  specific	  mechanism	  He	  had	  approved	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  earthly	  political	  power:	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled.21	  As	  John	  Dunn	  noted	  some	  time	  ago,	  ‘There	  is	  no	  such	  category	  in	  Locke’s	  political	  theory	  as	  authority	  which	  is	  both	  intrinsically	  human	  and	  legitimate’.22	  Locke	  rejected	  Hobbes’s	  thoroughgoing	  conception	  of	  natural	  unsociability,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  counter	  this	  with	  a	  statement	  of	  man’s	  being	  thoroughly	  sociable,	  either.23	  Instead	  he	  claimed	  that	  ‘God	  having	  made	  Man	  such	  a	  Creature,	  that,	  in	  his	  own	  Judgement,	  it	  was	  not	  good	  for	  him	  to	  be	  alone,	  put	  him	  under	  strong	  Obligations	  of	  Necessity,	  Convenience	  and	  Inclination	  to	  drive	  him	  into	  Society,	  as	  well	  as	  fitted	  him	  with	  Understanding	  and	  Language	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  269,	  §4.	  For	  a	  sustained	  investigation	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  premise	  to	  both	  Locke’s	  thought	  and	  of	  its	  relevant	  to	  contemporary	  political	  theory	  see	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  
God,	  Locke,	  and	  Equality:	  Christian	  Foundations	  in	  Locke’s	  Political	  Thought	  (Cambridge,	  2002).	  20	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  270-­‐1,	  §6.	  21	  ‘Men	  being…by	  Nature,	  all	  free,	  equal	  and	  independent,	  no	  one	  can	  be	  put	  out	  of	  his	  Estate,	  and	  subjected	  to	  the	  Political	  Power	  of	  another,	  without	  his	  own	  Consent’:	  ibid,	  p.	  330,	  §95.	  22	  Dunn,	  Political	  Thought	  of	  John	  Locke,	  p.	  127.	  23	  Thanks	  to	  Peter	  Laslett	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  recognized	  that	  Locke’s	  primary	  intellectual	  target	  in	  writing	  the	  Two	  Treatises	  was	  the	  patriarchal	  theory	  of	  Sir	  Robert	  Filmer,	  not	  Hobbes.	  I	  here	  broadly	  agree	  with	  the	  reading	  offered	  in	  Dunn,	  Political	  Thought	  of	  John	  Locke,	  chapter	  7,	  that	  Locke	  did	  not	  undertake	  serious	  intellectual	  engagement	  with	  Hobbes	  in	  the	  Two	  Treatises,	  but	  mostly	  made	  polemical	  remarks	  intended	  to	  implicate	  that	  position	  without	  troubling	  to	  tackle	  it	  directly.	  That	  said,	  Locke	  was	  clearly	  familiar	  with	  Hobbes’s	  views,	  and	  in	  asserting	  that	  men	  was	  driven	  to	  society	  in	  efforts	  to	  secure	  utility	  would	  have	  known	  that	  he	  was	  writing	  in	  opposition	  to	  Hobbes.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  precisely	  by	  asserting	  an	  attenuated	  utility-­‐orientated	  view	  of	  human	  sociability	  that	  Locke	  is	  able	  to	  largely	  by-­‐pass	  Hobbes’s	  arguments.	  His	  alternative	  conception	  of	  sociability	  contributes	  to	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  being	  a	  state	  of	  inconvenience	  rather	  than	  full-­‐blown	  war,	  meaning	  the	  departure	  point	  for	  Locke’s	  intellectual	  endeavor	  is	  crucially	  different	  from	  Hobbes’s,	  enabling	  the	  marginalization	  of	  Hobbes’s	  political	  theory	  that	  Dunn	  describes.	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continue	  to	  enjoy	  it’.24	  Human	  beings	  lack	  any	  specific	  appetite	  for	  society.	  But	  in	  their	  natural	  condition	  the	  human	  predilection	  for	  (to	  revert	  to	  Hobbes’s	  term)	  ‘honour’	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  disrupt	  pursuit	  of	  the	  clear	  utility	  gains	  of	  grouping	  together	  for	  ‘advantage’.	  Hence	  whilst	  men	  were	  ‘driven’	  to	  society	  rather	  than	  seeking	  it	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  this	  was	  essentially	  unproblematic.	  Locke	  here	  postulated	  man	  as	  he	  was	  in	  his	  specifically	  natural	  condition,	  understood	  as	  obtaining	  prior	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  political	  society	  and	  before	  a	  subsequent	  process	  of	  moral	  corruption	  rendered	  the	  desire	  for	  recognition	  much	  more	  problematic.25	  It	  is	  essential	  however	  to	  appreciate	  that	  this	  natural	  condition	  was	  analysed	  by	  Locke	  in	  two	  complementary,	  but	  distinct,	  frameworks:	  juridical	  and	  historical.	  We	  must	  carefully	  distinguish,	  and	  then	  interrelate,	  both	  these	  frameworks	  if	  we	  are	  to	  properly	  appreciate	  the	  foundations	  and	  force	  of	  Locke’s	  political	  theory.	  Locke’s	  juridical	  account	  of	  man’s	  natural	  condition	  was	  styled	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  the	  ‘state	  of	  nature’,	  and	  has	  attracted	  by	  far	  the	  greatest	  attention	  (although	  its	  status	  as	  a	  normative	  framework,	  rather	  than	  a	  real	  historical	  proposition,	  is	  often	  misunderstood).26	  Considered	  from	  the	  juridical	  viewpoint	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  318-­‐9,	  §77.	  25	  In	  this	  sense	  Locke	  embryonically	  foreshadows	  Rousseau’s	  response	  to	  Hobbes.	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  Rousseau	  and	  Locke,	  see	  Christopher	  Brooke,	  ‘"Locke	  En	  Particulier	  Les	  a	  Traitées	  Exactement	  Dans	  les	  Mêmes	  Principes	  que	  Moi":	  Revisiting	  the	  Relationship	  Between	  Locke	  and	  Rousseau’,	  in	  Locke’s	  Political	  Liberty:	  Readings	  and	  Misreadings,	  ed.	  C.	  Miqueu	  and	  M.	  Chamie,	  (Oxford,	  2009).	  	  26	  cf.	  Dunn,	  Political	  Thought	  of	  John	  Locke,	  pp.	  97,	  103	  and	  in	  general	  chapter	  9;	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  p.	  142.	  For	  detailed	  discussions	  of	  Locke’s	  juridical	  political	  theory	  see	  Ross	  Harrison,	  Hobbes,	  Locke	  and	  Confusion’s	  Masterpiece:	  An	  Examination	  of	  
Seventeenth	  Century	  Political	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge,	  2003);	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  
Anarchy:	  Locke,	  Consent,	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Society	  (Princeton	  N.J.,	  1993);	  ‘“Denisons”	  and	  “aliens”:	  Locke’s	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Consent’,	  in	  Justification	  and	  Legitimacy:	  Essays	  on	  Rights	  and	  
Obligations,	  (Cambridge,	  2001);	  John	  Marshall,	  John	  Locke:	  Resistance,	  Religion	  and	  Responsibility	  (Cambridge,	  1994),	  chapter	  6;	  James	  Tully,	  An	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Theory:	  Locke	  in	  Contexts	  (Cambridge,	  1993),	  chapter	  1.	  For	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  Locke’s	  political	  intervention,	  see	  especially	  Richard	  Ashcraft,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  and	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	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men	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  are	  not	  only	  natural	  equals,	  but	  also	  in	  a	  state	  of	  liberty	  to	  do	  as	  they	  please	  within	  the	  bounds	  set	  by	  natural	  law,	  itself	  accessible	  to	  anybody	  with	  the	  basic	  capacities	  of	  reason	  (thus	  Locke’s	  famous	  dictum	  that	  a	  state	  of	  liberty	  was	  not	  a	  state	  of	  license).27	  Property	  could	  be	  acquired	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  by	  mixing	  one’s	  labour	  with	  the	  materials	  of	  the	  earth,	  following	  God’s	  imperative	  that	  men	  must	  not	  only	  use	  but	  also	  improve	  His	  bounty,	  being	  permitted	  to	  keep	  the	  increased	  fruit	  of	  their	  labours	  so	  long	  as	  their	  appropriation	  of	  what	  was	  previously	  held	  in	  common	  left	  ‘enough,	  and	  as	  good…for	  others’.28	  Property	  rights	  were	  hence	  entirely	  compatible	  with	  pre-­‐political	  circumstances.	  Yet	  their	  enforcement	  in	  such	  conditions	  was	  deeply	  problematic.	  Locke	  put	  forward	  the	  ‘strange	  doctrine’,	  earlier	  suggested	  by	  Grotius,	  that	  each	  individual	  was	  equipped	  with	  a	  natural	  right	  to	  punish	  those	  who	  violated	  his	  rights.29	  But	  as	  a	  consequence	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  was	  characterized	  by	  ‘inconvenience’	  of	  dual	  foundation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  without	  settled	  laws	  and	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  one’s	  property	  was	  forever	  at	  risk	  from	  the	  illegitimate	  acquisitive	  advances	  of	  others.	  On	  the	  other,	  one	  was	  tasked	  with	  the	  enforcing	  of	  one’s	  rights	  –	  both	  defensively	  and	  retributively	  –	  oneself,	  a	  considerable	  and	  dangerous	  burden.	  Given	  that	  men	  are	  naturally	  partial	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  poor	  judges	  of	  equity	  in	  matters	  that	  regard	  themselves,	  individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Princeton,	  N.J.,	  1986)	  and	  Mark	  Goldie,	  ‘John	  Locke	  and	  Anglican	  royalism’,	  Political	  studies	  31	  (1983),	  pp.	  61-­‐85.	  	  27	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  269-­‐72,	  §4-­‐9.	  28	  Ibid.,	  p.	  288,	  §27.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  Locke’s	  theory	  of	  property	  and	  its	  fundamentally	  theistic	  basis,	  see	  Alan	  Ryan,	  Property	  and	  Political	  theory	  (Oxford,	  1984),	  chapter	  1;	  Karl	  Olivecrona,	  ‘Appropriation	  in	  the	  State	  of	  Nature:	  Locke	  on	  the	  Origin	  of	  Property’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  
Ideas	  35	  (1974),	  pp.	  211-­‐30;	  Waldron,	  God,	  Locke	  and	  Equality,	  chapter	  6.	  29	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  272;	  Hugo	  Grotius,	  De	  Iure	  Praedae	  Commentarius,	  ed.	  G.L.	  Williams	  (Oxford,	  1950),	  p.	  92;	  The	  Rights	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  ed.	  R.	  Tuck	  (Indianpolis,	  2005),	  pp.	  953-­‐68.	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exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  punish	  led	  to	  exacerbated	  conflict.30	  The	  solution	  was	  for	  men	  to	  relinquish	  their	  natural	  right	  to	  punish	  unto	  a	  centralized	  system	  of	  arbitration,	  undertaken	  by	  an	  impartial	  power	  enforcing	  judgements.31	  This	  was	  the	  foundation	  of	  political	  power	  proper:	  the	  erection	  of	  a	  common	  arbiter	  for	  the	  defence	  and	  regulation	  of	  property,	  thus	  better	  promoting	  the	  mutual	  advancement	  of	  utility.32	  Men	  consented	  to	  be	  ruled	  by	  others	  so	  as	  to	  escape	  the	  inconvenience	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  on	  condition	  that	  such	  rule	  continued	  to	  advance	  their	  utility.	  Locke’s	  juridical	  framework	  thus	  supplied	  a	  tandem	  account	  of	  both	  the	  utility	  and	  authority	  of	  government.	  The	  end	  of	  political	  society	  was	  the	  advancement	  of	  utility	  as	  furthered	  by	  the	  institution	  of	  property,	  overseen	  and	  protected	  by	  government,	  whilst	  the	  authority	  of	  that	  government	  came	  from	  the	  consent	  of	  those	  natural	  equals	  who	  freely	  agreed	  to	  submit	  themselves	  to	  it	  for	  the	  utility	  benefits	  it	  yielded.	  	  	  Being	  a	  juridical	  stylization	  Locke’s	  state	  of	  nature	  was	  not	  temporally	  bounded,	  but	  defined	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  common	  arbiter	  to	  settle	  disputes,	  entailing	  that	  men	  had	  to	  resort	  to	  individual	  exercise	  of	  the	  natural	  right	  to	  punish.	  As	  a	  consequence	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  could	  potentially	  obtain	  at	  any	  historical	  moment.	  A	  highwayman	  demanding	  one’s	  purse	  when	  there	  was	  no	  hope	  of	  rescue	  by	  the	  established	  authorities	  of	  the	  land	  put	  himself	  into	  a	  state	  of	  nature	  with	  his	  victim,	  who	  in	  turn	  had	  the	  right	  to	  fight	  off,	  and	  if	  necessary	  kill,	  the	  assailant.33	  Locke	  turned	  this	  notion	  to	  his	  specific	  polemical	  purposes	  in	  the	  Two	  Treatises,	  arguing	  that	  because	  political	  society	  was	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  274-­‐6,	  §12-­‐13.	  31	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  274-­‐6,	  §12-­‐13.	  32	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  350-­‐3,	  §123-­‐31.	  33	  Ibid.,	  p.	  279-­‐80,	  §18,	  though	  natural	  law	  forbade	  the	  seizing	  of	  the	  assailant’s	  property.	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common	  arbiter,	  it	  was	  incompatible	  with	  absolute	  power	  (which	  was	  by	  definition	  arbitrary	  power)	  and	  thus	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  into	  even	  more	  incommodious	  and	  dangerous	  conditions.34	  The	  result	  that	  Locke	  left	  for	  readers	  to	  infer	  was	  that	  alongside	  his	  frontal	  assault	  on	  Robert	  Filmer’s	  patriarchalist	  theory	  of	  monarchical	  power,	  he	  was	  sanctioning	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  individuals	  attacking	  and	  killing	  any	  ruler	  who	  claimed	  absolute	  power	  over	  subjects,	  as	  being	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  ‘wild	  Savage	  Beasts	  with	  whom	  Men	  can	  have	  no	  Society	  or	  Security’,	  to	  be	  destroyed	  in	  legitimate	  self	  defence.35	  	  Locke’s	  juridical	  theory	  was	  not,	  however,	  intended	  as	  an	  account	  of	  how	  human	  beings	  had	  in	  historical	  practice	  come	  to	  form	  modern	  societies	  ruled	  by	  government	  as	  found	  everywhere	  in	  western	  Europe.36	  Human	  beings	  initially	  formed	  family	  groupings	  to	  satisfy	  the	  sex	  instinct,	  continued	  them	  in	  order	  to	  better	  rear	  the	  resulting	  offspring,	  experienced	  the	  utility	  benefits	  of	  ongoing	  association	  which	  they	  therefore	  sustained,	  and	  gradually	  expanded	  these	  to	  include	  master	  and	  servant	  relationships.37	  Historically	  these	  groupings	  remained	  within	  the	  juridical	  state	  of	  nature	  insofar	  as	  obedience	  was	  delivered	  to	  the	  patriarch	  not	  because	  subservient	  family	  members	  consented	  to	  his	  rule	  as	  a	  political	  relationship,	  but	  out	  of	  gratitude,	  filial	  piety,	  and	  informal	  convenience.38	  Yet	  over	  time	  patriarchal	  families	  organically	  transitioned	  to	  the	  status	  of	  political	  society	  proper	  as	  facilitated	  by	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled.	  Being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  284-­‐5,	  326-­‐7,	  §23-­‐4,	  90-­‐2.	  35	  Ibid.,	  p.	  274,	  §11.	  36	  As	  Hont	  puts	  it,	  ‘Locke	  was	  obviously	  not	  a	  theorist	  of	  original	  contract	  when	  thinking	  about	  the	  historical	  emergence	  of	  government’:	  ‘Smith’s	  History	  of	  Law	  and	  Government’,	  p.	  143.	  And	  as	  Hont	  further	  notes,	  Peter	  Laslett	  long	  ago	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  term	  ‘contract’	  appears	  only	  about	  ten	  times	  in	  the	  entire	  Second	  Treatise,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  ‘compact’	  and	  ‘agreement’	  that	  creates	  a	  society	  in	  historical	  practice:	  Peter	  Laslett,	  ‘Introduction’,	  in	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  3-­‐122,	  pp.	  113-­‐4.	  37	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  316-­‐8,	  321-­‐3,	  §74,	  81-­‐3.	  38	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  303-­‐15,	  336-­‐44,	  §52-­‐72,	  105-­‐112.	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accustomed	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  patriarch	  before	  nonage	  when	  children	  reached	  maturity	  they	  would	  look	  to	  this	  established	  source	  of	  leadership	  to	  become	  the	  neutral	  arbiter	  for	  settling	  disputes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  most	  effective	  governmental	  structure	  for	  organizing	  defence	  against	  incursions	  by	  aggressive	  rival	  groupings	  attracted	  by	  increased	  material	  prosperity.39	  In	  this	  way	  men	  historically	  consented	  to	  be	  ruled	  by	  a	  common	  arbiter,	  and	  to	  give	  up	  exercise	  of	  their	  natural	  right	  to	  punish,	  with	  succession	  typically	  granted	  to	  the	  sons	  of	  successful	  patriarchs.	  ‘Thus	  the	  natural	  Fathers	  of	  Families,	  by	  an	  insensible	  change,	  became	  the	  politick	  Monarchs	  of	  them	  too’.	  This	  explained	  why	  the	  earliest	  political	  societies	  were	  always	  kingdoms.	  As	  the	  first	  patriarchs	  ‘chanced	  to	  live	  long,	  and	  leave	  able,	  and	  worthy	  Heirs,	  for	  several	  Successions,	  or	  otherwise;	  So	  they	  laid	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Hereditary,	  or	  Elective	  Kingdoms,	  under	  several	  Constitutions,	  and	  Manners,	  according	  to	  Chance,	  Contrivance,	  or	  Occasions	  happen’d	  to	  mould	  them’.40	  The	  juridical	  state	  of	  nature	  as	  a	  prevailing	  condition	  over	  large	  areas	  of	  territory	  was	  historically	  exited	  by	  an	  ‘insensible’	  transition	  from	  patriarchal	  authority	  (which	  was	  ex	  hypothesi	  non-­‐political),	  to	  political	  power	  proper	  as	  founded	  in	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  God-­‐created	  free	  equals	  who	  benefited	  from	  its	  establishment	  and	  enlargement,	  and	  thus	  agreed	  to	  its	  erection	  and	  continuation.	  Yet	  to	  this	  historical	  story	  Locke	  added	  a	  further	  postulation.	  This	  was	  that	  after	  entering	  political	  society	  man	  had	  undergone	  a	  process	  of	  corruption	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  338-­‐40,	  §107-­‐8;	  ‘As	  Locke	  pointed	  out,	  communities	  were	  threatened	  existentially	  much	  more	  from	  the	  outside,	  by	  other	  communities,	  than	  by	  the	  domestic	  criminality	  of	  individuals.	  Hence	  the	  idea	  of	  leadership,	  the	  rule	  of	  man	  over	  man,	  first	  originated	  from	  attempts	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  of	  external	  security	  which	  necessitated	  the	  creation	  of	  military	  command’:	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  p.	  143.	  40	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  318,	  §76.	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that	  caused	  him	  to	  lose	  the	  ‘Golden	  Age’	  of	  the	  earliest	  political	  societies.41	  The	  cause	  of	  this	  corruption	  was	  economic.	  The	  invention	  of	  money	  had	  allowed	  men,	  whilst	  remaining	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  natural	  law,	  to	  accumulate	  vast	  quantities	  of	  non-­‐perishable	  material	  wealth,	  thus	  avoiding	  violation	  of	  the	  ‘enough,	  and	  as	  good’	  proviso	  but	  drastically	  increasing	  inequality	  and	  in	  turn	  comparative	  envy.42	  This	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  economies	  of	  luxury	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  material	  superfluities,	  which	  produced	  ‘vain	  Ambition,	  and	  amor	  sceleratus	  
habendi,	  evil	  Concupiscence’	  and	  ‘corrupted	  Mens	  minds	  into	  a	  Mistake	  of	  true	  Power	  and	  Honour’.43	  	  	  The	  political	  consequences	  of	  this	  economic	  revolution	  were	  profound.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  golden	  age	  men	  had	  ‘more	  Virtue,	  and	  consequently	  better	  Governours,	  as	  well	  as	  less	  vicious	  Subjects’,	  the	  advent	  of	  ‘Ambition	  and	  Luxury’	  caused	  ‘Princes	  to	  have	  distinct	  and	  separate	  Interests	  from	  their	  People’.	  As	  a	  result	  ‘Men	  found	  it	  necessary	  to	  examine	  more	  carefully	  the	  original	  and	  Rights	  of	  Government;	  and	  to	  find	  out	  ways	  to	  restrain	  the	  Exorbitances,	  and	  prevent	  the	  
Abuses	  of	  that	  Power	  which	  they	  having	  intrusted	  in	  another’s	  hands	  only	  for	  their	  own	  good,	  they	  found	  was	  used	  to	  hurt	  them’.44	  Checks	  to	  judicial	  and	  executive	  power	  had	  to	  be	  introduced	  to	  guarantee	  the	  salus	  populi,	  as	  rulers	  increasingly	  abused	  the	  trust	  put	  in	  them.	  This	  was	  achieved	  by	  the	  innovation	  of	  legislative	  power,	  a	  mechanism	  for	  better	  arbitrating	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  social	  conflict	  following	  the	  advent	  of	  economic	  prosperity	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  property	  rights,	  whilst	  protecting	  peoples	  from	  the	  ravages	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  338-­‐343,	  §107-­‐11.	  42	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  341-­‐3,	  §110-­‐11,	  cf.	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  pp.	  143-­‐4.	  43	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  342,	  §111.	  44	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  342-­‐3,	  §111.	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of	  rulers	  who	  could	  not	  be	  trusted	  outside	  of	  the	  relatively	  idyllic	  simplicity	  of	  pre-­‐modernity.45	  Furthermore,	  and	  of	  particular	  importance	  for	  the	  question	  of	  political	  authority,	  the	  corruption	  of	  men’s	  sentiments	  by	  ambition	  and	  luxury	  meant	  that	  present	  governments	  could	  not	  claim	  legitimacy	  by	  direct	  descent	  from	  the	  earliest	  kings,	  who	  had	  directly	  received	  their	  authority	  by	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled.	  The	  economic	  sea-­‐change	  that	  introduced	  modernity	  meant	  that	  governmental	  legitimacy	  in	  juridical	  terms	  had	  to	  be	  re-­‐founded	  in	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  people,	  in	  line	  with	  full	  acknowledgement	  that	  man’s	  situation	  was	  now	  characterized	  by	  potentially	  severe	  misalignment	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  princes	  and	  subjects.	  	  Providing	  for	  such	  consent,	  however,	  threatened	  to	  constitute	  a	  serious	  stumbling	  block	  for	  Locke.	  Manifestly	  there	  had	  never	  been	  any	  act	  of	  political	  re-­‐founding	  for	  modern	  conditions	  in	  recorded,	  or	  even	  plausible	  conjectural,	  history:	  no	  moment	  at	  which	  modern	  people’s	  had	  expressly	  given	  their	  consent	  to	  forms	  of	  government	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  salus	  populi	  with	  especial	  regards	  to	  the	  defence	  of	  property,	  which	  Locke	  identified	  as	  the	  justificatory	  basis	  of	  all	  government.46	  Locke’s	  solution	  to	  this	  predicament	  –	  much	  more	  powerful	  and	  conceptually	  adept	  than	  is	  typically	  realised	  –	  was	  his	  notorious	  invocation	  of	  tacit	  consent.	  Men	  were	  said	  to	  have	  given	  ‘sufficient	  Declaration’	  of	  consent	  to	  be	  ‘subject	  to	  the	  Laws	  of	  any	  Government’	  when	  they	  ‘hath	  any	  Possession,	  or	  Enjoyment,	  of	  any	  part	  of	  the	  Dominions	  of	  Government’,	  extending	  not	  just	  to	  the	  possession	  of	  land	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  law,	  but	  ‘barely	  travelling	  freely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  p.	  144.	  46	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  pp.	  350-­‐1,	  §123-­‐4.	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on	  the	  Highway’.47	  Whilst	  naturalized	  foreigners	  needed	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  act	  of	  explicit	  consenting	  to	  join	  a	  political	  society,	  those	  born	  into	  it	  gave	  their	  sufficient	  consent	  tacitly	  by	  enjoying	  the	  benefits	  of	  organised	  power	  and	  choosing	  not	  to	  decamp	  to	  the	  wilderness	  of	  America	  to	  start	  political	  society	  afresh	  upon	  reaching	  maturity.	  Lying	  behind	  Locke’s	  supposition	  of	  tacit	  consent	  was	  his	  juridical	  framework	  with	  its	  stipulation	  that	  government	  was	  founded	  on	  the	  twin	  principles	  of	  utility	  and	  authority.	  Tacit	  consent	  was	  a	  bilateral	  phenomenon.	  Subjects	  indicated	  that	  they	  gave	  such	  consent	  by	  staying	  within	  a	  government’s	  territory	  and	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  improved	  living	  it	  made	  possible.	  But	  equally,	  such	  consent	  was	  always	  given	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  rulers	  of	  political	  society	  continuously	  promoted	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  ruled	  to	  a	  sufficient	  degree.	  If	  a	  government	  failed	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  salus	  populi,	  it	  violated	  the	  grounds	  of	  utility,	  and	  hence	  forfeited	  the	  basis	  of	  authority.	  Due	  to	  Locke’s	  polemical	  purposes	  in	  writing	  the	  Two	  Treatises	  as	  an	  intellectual	  justification	  for	  armed	  revolution,	  it	  is	  the	  insurrectionist	  side	  of	  his	  conceptual	  coin	  that	  tends	  to	  be	  emphasised:	  that	  if	  government	  sufficiently	  harms	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  people,	  then	  the	  people	  may	  rightfully	  rebel	  and	  over-­‐throw	  it	  –	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  intrinsically	  secular	  justification	  for	  such	  action,	  human	  judgement	  being	  fallible,	  and	  with	  the	  situation	  ultimately	  devolving	  to	  ‘an	  appeal	  to	  heaven’.48	  But	  Locke	  was	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  situation	  was	  highly	  unusual,	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  347-­‐8,	  §119.	  48	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  282,	  426-­‐7,	  §20,	  240-­‐2.	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people	  needing	  to	  be	  pushed	  a	  very	  long	  way	  before	  rebellion	  was	  actually	  likely	  to	  be	  triggered.49	  	  The	  more	  normal	  state	  of	  affairs,	  which	  Locke’s	  juridical	  framework	  also	  covered,	  related	  not	  to	  the	  right	  of	  revolution	  but	  to	  the	  right	  of	  legitimate	  governmental	  coercion.	  The	  government	  of	  a	  political	  society	  that	  successfully	  upheld	  salus	  populi	  and	  was	  tacitly	  consented	  to	  by	  its	  subjects	  possessed	  rightful	  authority	  over	  its	  populace.	  As	  a	  consequence	  such	  a	  government	  could	  legitimately	  deploy	  coercive	  force	  –	  the	  necessary	  means	  of	  political	  rule	  –	  with	  regards	  to	  that	  populace.	  Utility	  and	  authority	  were	  thus	  deeply	  intertwined	  for	  Locke,	  and	  the	  innovation	  of	  tacit	  consent	  was	  much	  more	  than	  an	  ad	  hoc	  innovation	  to	  get	  around	  the	  evident	  lack	  of	  an	  historical	  Ur-­‐revolution	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  modern	  politics.	  Tacit	  consent	  tied	  subjects	  to	  established	  government	  whilst	  generating	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  such	  government’s	  authority	  in	  the	  ordering	  of	  political	  society.	  Accordingly,	  whilst	  governmental	  authority	  certainly	  depended	  upon	  the	  delivery	  of	  utility,	  the	  point	  also	  cut	  the	  other	  way.	  Insofar	  as	  citizens	  were	  the	  recipients	  of	  sufficient	  levels	  of	  utility,	  they	  granted	  authority	  to	  the	  government	  that	  provided	  it	  –	  tacitly,	  but	  no	  less	  conclusively.50	  This	  was	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  political	  obligation.	  It	  was	  irredeemably	  theistic	  insofar	  as	  its	  lynchpin	  –	  consent	  –	  could	  only	  have	  the	  normative	  force	  Locke	  ascribed	  to	  it	  by	  granting	  Locke’s	  foundational	  premise	  that	  God	  made	  us	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  416-­‐8,	  §228.	  50	  Hont’s	  claim	  that	  Locke	  believed	  ‘that	  the	  corruption	  of	  early	  governments	  could	  be	  reversed	  only	  through	  active	  resistance	  and	  revolution’	  is	  therefore	  an	  overstatement	  (‘Smith’s	  History	  of	  Law	  and	  Government’,	  p.	  143).	  The	  advent	  of	  tacit	  consent	  meant	  that	  resistance	  and	  revolution	  was	  the	  exception,	  not	  the	  norm,	  resorted	  to	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  extreme	  necessity.	  As	  Locke	  rhetorically	  put	  it	  when	  making	  a	  different	  but	  connected	  point:	  ‘how	  came	  so	  many	  lawful	  Monarchies	  into	  the	  World?’	  –	  the	  point	  being	  that	  the	  world	  was	  populated	  with	  lawful	  (i.e.	  legitimate)	  monarchies,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  and	  despite	  the	  general	  lack	  of	  Ur-­‐acts	  of	  resistance	  and	  revolution	  (Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  344,	  §113).	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all	  equal	  and	  free	  in	  juridical	  terms,	  even	  if	  in	  real	  history	  the	  central	  fact	  that	  had	  to	  be	  negotiated	  was	  that	  men	  were	  everywhere	  and	  always	  unequal	  in	  their	  physical,	  economic,	  and	  rational	  capacities.	  But	  it	  was	  nonetheless	  a	  powerful,	  and	  within	  its	  own	  terms,	  coherent,	  account	  of	  why	  legitimate	  government	  could	  coerce,	  and	  why	  by	  the	  very	  same	  lights	  illegitimate	  government	  could	  be	  removed.	  Smith’s	  later	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  was	  an	  ambitious	  attempt	  to	  ‘fill	  the	  enormous	  gap	  that	  Locke	  left	  between	  his	  history	  of	  early	  governments	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  English	  constitutional	  crisis	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century’.51	  Smith	  displaced	  Locke’s	  historical	  story,	  replacing	  the	  account	  of	  liberty	  gained	  and	  lost	  due	  to	  a	  luxury-­‐engendered	  corruption	  with	  a	  complex	  historical	  triad	  of	  liberty	  gained,	  lost,	  and	  regained	  thanks	  to	  the	  motor	  of	  economic	  luxury,	  which	  could	  ultimately	  be	  politically	  vindicated	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  modern	  liberty.52	  But	  the	  central	  political	  theoretic	  action	  in	  Locke’s	  account	  is	  ultimately	  not	  in	  his	  historical	  story	  of	  man’s	  natural	  condition	  (and	  his	  subsequent	  exit	  from	  that	  condition	  in	  real	  historical	  practice),	  but	  in	  his	  underpinning	  normative	  juridical	  framework.	  Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government	  by	  itself	  cannot	  touch	  Locke’s	  underlying	  explanation	  of	  how	  and	  why	  legitimate	  political	  authority	  is	  generated:	  it	  can	  only	  propose	  a	  different,	  more	  optimistic,	  view	  of	  mankind’s	  past	  and	  progress.	  For	  an	  alternative	  theory	  of	  political	  obligation,	  one	  that	  presents	  a	  direct	  alternative	  to	  Locke’s	  theism,	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  p.	  149.	  52	  Ibid.,	  p.	  165.	  Whether	  luxury	  could	  be	  morally	  vindicated	  is	  a	  separate	  question.	  Smith’s	  late	  scepticism	  on	  this	  matter,	  expressed	  in	  a	  revision	  to	  the	  final	  edition	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  
Sentiments,	  is	  well-­‐known:	  ‘The	  disposition	  to	  admire,	  and	  almost	  to	  worship,	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  powerful,	  and	  to	  despise,	  or,	  at	  least,	  to	  neglect	  persons	  of	  poor	  and	  mean	  condition,	  though	  necessary	  both	  to	  establish	  and	  to	  maintain	  the	  distinction	  of	  ranks	  and	  the	  order	  of	  society,	  is,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  great	  and	  most	  universal	  cause	  of	  the	  corruption	  of	  our	  moral	  sentiments’,	  Adam	  Smith,	  The	  Glasgow	  Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  and	  Correspondence,	  Volume	  1:	  The	  Theory	  of	  
Moral	  Sentiments,	  ed.	  D.D.	  Raphael	  and	  A.L.	  Macfie	  (Oxford,	  1976),	  p	  61.	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must	  ultimately	  locate	  the	  primary	  point	  of	  disagreement	  as	  being	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  juridical,	  not	  the	  historical,	  account.	  And	  for	  that	  we	  must	  turn	  not	  to	  Smith,	  but	  to	  Hume.	  
II	  –	  Hume’s	  Alternative	  Hume	  agreed	  with	  Locke	  that	  property	  could	  exist	  prior	  to	  the	  erection	  of	  governmental	  power,	  although	  he	  accounted	  for	  this	  through	  the	  workings	  of	  human	  imagination	  rather	  than	  a	  labour-­‐mixing	  theory	  of	  acquisition.	  Property	  was	  a	  species	  of	  causation:	  the	  mind	  attributed	  a	  ‘necessary	  connexion’	  to	  external	  relations	  (in	  this	  case,	  human	  individuals	  and	  physical	  objects)	  which	  in	  fact	  had	  its	  basis	  in	  the	  mind	  itself	  due	  to	  repeat	  exposure	  to	  regularities	  of	  convention,	  not	  any	  relations	  detected	  between	  external	  objects.53	  Yet	  after	  human	  societies	  grew	  to	  such	  a	  size	  that	  anonymity	  and	  the	  possibility	  for	  self-­‐interested	  defection	  overcame	  the	  bonds	  of	  sympathy	  and	  mutual	  affection,	  the	  innovation	  of	  magistracy	  was	  required	  to	  settle	  disputes	  over	  property	  in	  a	  satisfactory	  way,	  impartial	  arbitration	  in	  such	  conditions	  being	  much	  preferable	  to	  the	  partial	  and	  self-­‐interested	  judgements	  of	  individual	  plaintiffs.54	  The	  innovation	  of	  magistracy,	  initially	  introduced	  to	  regulate	  the	  possession	  and	  transfer	  of	  property	  by	  redirecting	  the	  short-­‐term	  pursuit	  of	  contiguous	  self-­‐interest	  to	  socially	  cohesive	  ends,	  led	  to	  the	  erection	  of	  government.	  In	  time,	  government	  developed	  to	  take	  on	  the	  role	  not	  just	  of	  protecting	  possessions,	  but	  of	  compelling	  men	  to	  partake	  in	  ‘concurrence	  in	  some	  common	  end	  or	  purpose’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  David	  Hume,	  The	  Clarendon	  Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  of	  David	  Hume:	  A	  Treatise	  of	  Human	  Nature,	  ed.	  D.F.	  Norton	  and	  M.J.	  Norton	  (Oxford,	  2007),	  T.2.1.10.1;	  SBN	  310;	  T.3.2.3.6-­‐8;	  SBN	  505-­‐7.	  54	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.7.7;	  SBN	  538.	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This	  enabled	  large-­‐scale	  collective	  action,	  and	  thus	  ‘bridges	  are	  built;	  harbours	  open’d;	  ramparts	  rais’d;	  canals	  form’d;	  fleets	  equip’d;	  and	  armies	  disciplin’d’.55	  	  But	  there	  was	  no	  guarantee	  that	  human	  beings	  would,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  actual	  historical	  development,	  develop	  the	  artifice	  of	  government.	  The	  tribes	  of	  North	  America	  demonstrated	  that	  men	  could	  live	  in	  ‘concord	  and	  amity’	  for	  thousands	  of	  years	  without	  formalizing	  mechanisms	  for	  resolving	  disputes	  over	  property.	  Instead,	  the	  bonds	  of	  tribal	  affection	  and	  the	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘moral’	  obligations	  to	  justice	  were	  sufficient	  to	  maintain	  successful	  small-­‐scale	  societies	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  and	  wants	  of	  their	  members.56	  ‘The	  state	  of	  society	  without	  government	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  natural	  states	  of	  men,	  and	  may	  subsist	  with	  the	  conjunction	  of	  many	  families,	  and	  long	  after	  first	  generation’.57	  Government	  in	  its	  modern	  form	  was	  a	  specific	  and	  geographically	  peculiar	  invention,	  carried	  to	  particular	  perfection	  in	  Europe	  (although	  other	  locales	  had	  also	  achieved	  this	  innovation,	  China	  being	  the	  oldest	  remaining	  non-­‐European	  example).	  Its	  origin	  thus	  required	  special	  explanation.	  Hume	  broadly	  agreed	  with	  Locke	  that	  the	  decisive	  change	  from	  pre-­‐governmental	  society	  to	  political	  organization	  proper	  came	  about	  due	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  competition	  between	  groups	  following	  economic	  development:	  ‘Nothing	  but	  an	  increase	  of	  riches	  and	  possessions	  cou’d	  oblige	  men	  to	  quit’	  their	  natural	  condition	  of	  concord	  and	  amity.58	  Men	  could	  maintain	  small-­‐scale	  primitive	  society,	  operating	  the	  artifice	  of	  justice	  even	  without	  government,	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.7.8;	  SBN	  538-­‐9.	  56	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.2;	  SBN	  540.	  57	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.2;	  SBN	  541.	  58	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.2;	  SBN	  541.	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in	  conditions	  of	  external	  security.	  If	  threatened	  by	  aggressive	  outsiders	  attracted	  by	  the	  material	  prosperity	  generated	  by	  group	  living,	  things	  were	  different:	  Men	  fear	  nothing	  from	  public	  war	  and	  violence	  but	  the	  resistance	  they	  meet	  with,	  which,	  because	  they	  share	  it	  in	  common,	  seems	  less	  terrible;	  and	  because	  it	  comes	  from	  strangers,	  seems	  less	  pernicious	  in	  its	  consequences,	  than	  when	  they	  are	  expos’d	  singly	  against	  one	  whose	  commerce	  is	  advantageous	  to	  them,	  and	  without	  whose	  society	  ’tis	  impossible	  they	  can	  subsist.	  Now	  foreign	  war	  to	  a	  society	  without	  government	  necessarily	  produces	  civil	  war.	  Throw	  any	  considerable	  goods	  among	  men,	  they	  instantly	  fall	  a	  quarrelling,	  while	  each	  strives	  to	  get	  possession	  of	  what	  pleases	  him,	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  consequences.	  In	  a	  foreign	  war	  the	  most	  considerable	  of	  all	  goods,	  life	  and	  limbs,	  are	  at	  stake;	  and	  as	  every	  one	  shuns	  dangerous	  ports,	  seizes	  the	  best	  arms,	  seeks	  excuse	  for	  the	  slightest	  wounds,	  the	  laws,	  which	  may	  be	  well	  enough	  observed	  while	  men	  were	  calm,	  can	  now	  no	  longer	  take	  place,	  when	  they	  are	  in	  such	  commotion.59	  Military	  organization	  for	  defence	  taught	  men	  the	  benefits	  of	  submitting	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  an	  individual	  who	  provided	  the	  decisive	  leadership	  required	  for	  security.	  Learning	  the	  advantages	  of	  this	  mode	  of	  organization,	  men	  later	  imported	  it	  back	  into	  civil	  arrangements.	  Magistrates	  were	  appointed	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  possessions,	  thus	  improving	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  artifice	  of	  justice	  in	  large	  and	  lasting	  conditions,	  and	  eventually	  enabling	  large-­‐scale	  co-­‐ordination	  to	  enhance	  public	  utility	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  all.	  This	  was	  the	  birth	  of	  government.	  Again	  the	  Native	  American	  tribes	  provided	  the	  proof,	  albeit	  via	  implicit	  comparison	  with	  their	  alternative	  historical	  experience.	  Only	  during	  times	  of	  war	  did	  individual	  Indians	  ‘pay	  any	  submission	  to	  any	  of	  their	  fellows’,	  when	  ‘their	  captain	  enjoys	  a	  shadow	  of	  authority,	  which	  he	  loses	  after	  return	  from	  the	  field,	  and	  the	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  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.1;	  SBN	  540.	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establishment	  of	  peace	  with	  neighbouring	  tribes’.60	  When	  hostilities	  ceased,	  the	  abundance	  of	  the	  North	  American	  geographical	  bounty	  meant	  the	  Indian	  tribes	  could	  revert	  to	  small-­‐scale	  societies	  operating	  justice	  without	  government.61	  The	  origin	  of	  European	  government	  lay	  in	  the	  geographical	  pressures	  of	  a	  smaller	  territory	  where	  resource	  scarcity	  and	  the	  proximity	  of	  rivals	  necessitated	  the	  retention	  of	  authoritative	  leadership	  in	  civil,	  as	  well	  as	  military,	  matters,	  not	  least	  because	  future	  conflicts	  with	  neighbours	  were	  correctly	  expected	  to	  recur.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  less	  resource-­‐rich	  environment	  of	  Europe	  had	  required	  more	  intensive	  cultivation	  of	  the	  land,	  which	  due	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  organised	  industry	  led	  to	  more	  rapid	  and	  considerable	  economic	  development	  than	  in	  North	  America,	  greed	  for	  which	  eventually	  triggered	  the	  wars	  of	  acquisition	  that	  gave	  birth	  to	  leadership,	  magistracy,	  and	  eventually	  government.	  	  Smith’s	  attempt	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  Locke	  left	  between	  his	  history	  of	  early	  governments	  and	  the	  English	  constitutional	  crisis	  thus	  had	  precedent.	  Hume	  had	  already	  suggested	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  historical	  story	  predicating	  economic	  development	  as	  the	  motor	  of	  history,	  even	  if	  in	  the	  Treatise	  we	  have	  to	  infer	  this	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  his	  position	  rather	  than	  it	  being	  stated	  outright.62	  Hume	  later	  supplied	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  story	  directly	  in	  The	  History	  of	  England,	  the	  medieval	  volumes	  of	  which	  argued	  that	  the	  English	  barons	  had	  dissolved	  their	  own	  power	  by	  pursuing	  luxury	  status	  goods	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  military	  power,	  allowing	  in	  turn	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  modern	  liberty	  as	  feudalism	  was	  replaced	  with	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  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.2;	  SBN	  540.	  61	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.2-­‐3;	  SBN	  540-­‐1.	  62	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government’,	  p.	  149.	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modern	  constitutional	  government.63	  That	  is,	  Hume	  offered	  the	  same	  basic	  account	  of	  the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  luxury	  and	  modern	  liberty	  that	  Adam	  Smith	  later	  placed	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Book	  3	  of	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations.	  In	  the	  Treatise	  Hume	  disparaged	  the	  Lockean	  suggestion	  that	  political	  leadership	  first	  emerged	  as	  the	  patriarchs	  of	  families	  were	  bequeathed	  political	  power	  by	  offspring	  already	  accustomed	  to	  their	  rule,	  taking	  his	  economic-­‐military	  hypothesis	  about	  the	  origin	  of	  government	  to	  ‘be	  more	  natural,	  than	  the	  common	  one	  deriv’d	  from	  patriarchal	  government,	  or	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  father,	  which	  is	  said	  first	  to	  take	  place	  in	  one	  family,	  and	  to	  accustom	  the	  members	  of	  it	  to	  the	  government	  of	  a	  single	  person’.64	  Furthermore,	  early	  leadership	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  economically-­‐triggered	  military	  competition	  straightforwardly	  accounted	  for	  why	  all	  political	  societies	  started	  as	  monarchies,	  and	  why	  ‘republics	  arise	  only	  from	  the	  abuses	  of	  monarchy	  and	  despotic	  power’.	  Military	  leadership	  had	  to	  be	  strictly	  hierarchical,	  a	  single	  decision-­‐making	  power	  vested	  with	  final	  say,	  which	  in	  turn	  became	  the	  essence	  of	  kingship	  as	  a	  form	  of	  civil	  rule.65	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  historically	  speaking	  Hume	  was	  more	  thoroughly	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  than	  Locke.	  Members	  of	  tribal	  groupings	  living	  in	  ‘amity	  and	  concord’,	  and	  operating	  the	  artifice	  of	  justice	  but	  not	  yet	  government,	  would,	  recognising	  the	  threat	  from	  external	  aggressors,	  initially	  meet	  together	  to	  expressly	  pledge	  obedience	  to	  the	  individual	  perceived	  as	  most	  capable	  in	  organizing	  defence:	  ‘When	  men	  have	  once	  perceiv’d	  the	  necessity	  of	  government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  History	  of	  England	  from	  the	  Invasion	  of	  Julius	  Caesar	  to	  the	  Revolution	  in	  1688,	  foreword	  by	  William	  B.	  Todd,	  6	  vols.	  (Indianapolis,	  1983),	  I,	  pp.	  463-­‐4;	  II,	  pp.	  523-­‐4;	  cf.	  Andrew	  Sabl,	  Hume’s	  
Politics:	  Coordination	  and	  Crisis	  in	  the	  History	  of	  England	  (Princeton	  N.J.,	  2012),	  pp.	  63-­‐8.	  64	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.2;	  SBN	  541,	  cf.	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  pp.	  468-­‐9.	  65	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.2;	  SBN	  540.	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to	  maintain	  peace,	  and	  execute	  justice,	  they	  wou’d	  naturally	  assemble	  together,	  wou’d	  choose	  magistrates,	  determine	  their	  power,	  and	  promise	  them	  obedience’.	  Learning	  the	  benefits	  of	  leadership	  in	  times	  of	  war,	  and	  seeing	  that	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  would	  be	  better	  maintained	  in	  times	  of	  peace	  if	  the	  innovation	  were	  retained,	  men	  initially	  promised	  obedience	  and	  erected	  government	  through	  a	  foundational	  act	  of	  consent.	  At	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  political	  societies,	  therefore,	  obedience	  to	  government	  was	  founded	  in	  the	  obligation	  arising	  from	  an	  act	  of	  promising,	  and	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  earliest	  governments	  was	  straightforwardly	  a	  function	  of	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled:	  ‘a	  promise’	  being	  ‘suppos’d	  to	  be	  a	  bond	  or	  security	  already	  in	  use,	  and	  attended	  with	  a	  moral	  obligation,	  ’tis	  to	  be	  consider’d	  as	  the	  original	  sanction	  of	  government,	  and	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  first	  obligation	  to	  obedience’.66	  Yet	  Hume	  denied	  that	  promising	  could	  be	  the	  foundation	  of	  authority	  or	  the	  basis	  of	  obligation	  with	  regards	  to	  government	  in	  conditions	  of	  European	  modernity.	  To	  demonstrate	  this	  he	  attacked	  not	  Locke’s	  specific	  account	  in	  the	  
Second	  Treatise,	  but	  the	  popularized	  Lockean	  position	  advanced	  by	  the	  Whig	  party	  of	  his	  day.	  The	  ‘foundation	  of	  our	  fashionable	  system	  of	  politics’	  and	  the	  ‘creed	  of	  a	  party	  amongst	  us’	  transplanted	  the	  historical	  plausibility	  of	  an	  original	  promise	  directly	  into	  contemporary	  conditions:	  	  
All	  men,	  say	  they,	  are	  born	  free	  and	  equal:	  Government	  and	  superiority	  can	  only	  be	  
established	  by	  consent:	  The	  consent	  of	  men,	  in	  establishing	  government,	  imposes	  
on	  them	  a	  new	  obligation,	  unknown	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  nature.	  Men,	  therefore,	  are	  
bound	  to	  obey	  their	  magistrates,	  only	  because	  they	  promise	  it;	  and	  if	  they	  had	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.3;	  SBN	  541,	  cf.	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  pp.	  468,	  474.	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given	  their	  word,	  either	  expressly	  or	  tacitly,	  to	  preserve	  allegiance,	  it	  would	  never	  
have	  become	  a	  part	  of	  their	  moral	  duty.67	  This	  was	  a	  vulgarized	  and	  secularized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  account.68	  (Indeed	  without	  appeal	  to	  consent	  as	  the	  divinely	  sanctioned	  mechanism	  by	  which	  authority	  could	  be	  generated,	  Locke	  himself	  would	  have	  repudiated	  it	  as	  conceptually	  incoherent	  and	  normatively	  inert.)	  Hume	  was	  scornful	  of	  this	  popularised	  Whig	  view:	  ‘when	  carry’d	  so	  far	  as	  to	  comprehend	  government	  in	  all	  its	  ages	  and	  situations,	  [it]	  is	  entirely	  erroneous’.69	  Such	  vulgar	  Lockeanism	  proceeded	  as	  though	  there	  were	  no	  difference	  between	  primitives	  establishing	  the	  first	  systems	  of	  hierarchical	  social	  organization,	  and	  European	  moderns	  who	  had	  inherited	  hundreds	  of	  years	  of	  constitutional	  history	  and	  institutional	  political	  practice.	  Such	  an	  equation	  was	  an	  absurdity,	  refuted	  by	  any	  common	  observation	  of	  the	  facts	  not	  corrupted	  by	  excessive	  party	  philosophy.	  By	  contrast,	  Hume	  maintained	  that	  although	  ‘the	  duty	  of	  allegiance	  be	  at	  first	  grafted	  on	  the	  obligation	  of	  promises,	  and	  be	  for	  some	  time	  supported	  by	  that	  obligation,	  yet	  as	  soon	  as	  advantages	  of	  government	  are	  fully	  known	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.3;	  SBN	  542.	  There	  is	  a	  historical	  puzzle	  here,	  however,	  insofar	  as	  by	  the	  late	  1730’s	  popularized	  Lockeanism	  was	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  altogether	  fashionable,	  being	  instead	  something	  of	  an	  embarrassment	  to	  establishment	  Court	  Whigs,	  and	  evidently	  of	  no	  appeal	  to	  opposition	  Tories.	  It	  is	  also	  arguable	  that	  the	  territory	  of	  political	  argument	  by	  this	  point	  had	  shifted	  from	  philosophical	  and	  jurisdiction	  notions	  of	  contract	  to	  historical	  narrative	  about	  an	  ancient	  constitution.	  Why,	  then,	  did	  Hume	  claim	  Lockeanism	  as	  the	  foundational	  philosophical	  theory	  of	  contemporary	  Whiggism?	  We	  may	  never	  possess	  a	  definitive	  answer,	  but	  it	  is	  surely	  relevant	  that	  Hume	  composed	  the	  Treatise	  in	  France,	  away	  from	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  party	  controversies	  of	  England.	  Furthermore,	  his	  interests	  were	  arguably	  of	  a	  deep	  philosophical	  kind,	  even	  if	  he	  took	  himself	  to	  be	  also	  capable	  of	  addressing	  relevant	  contemporary	  issues.	  That	  is,	  here	  is	  an	  example	  where	  attempting	  to	  tie	  Hume	  closely	  to	  the	  live	  practical	  political	  context	  of	  his	  time	  is	  liable	  to	  confuse,	  rather	  than	  illuminate,	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  political	  thought.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  an	  anonymous	  reader	  of	  the	  Journal	  for	  raising	  this	  matter.	  68	  For	  Hume	  as	  criticizing	  ‘vulgar’	  Whig	  doctrines	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  fundamentally	  friendly,	  if	  severe,	  critic,	  who	  sought	  instead	  to	  supply	  a	  ‘scientific’	  basis	  for	  Whig	  politics,	  see	  Forbes,	  
Hume’s	  Philosophical	  Politics,	  pp.	  126,	  139,	  150-­‐3.	  The	  division	  between	  ‘vulgar’	  and	  ‘scientific’	  Whiggism	  is	  something	  of	  a	  joke	  on	  Forbes’s	  part:	  Hont,	  ‘Commercial	  Society	  and	  Political	  Theory’,	  p.	  59.	  69	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.3;	  SBN	  542.	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acknowledg’d,	  it	  immediately	  takes	  root	  of	  itself,	  and	  has	  an	  original	  obligation	  and	  authority,	  independent	  of	  all	  contracts’.70	  	  Dispatching	  the	  vulgarized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  account	  was	  child’s	  play.	  Drawing	  on	  his	  own	  theory	  of	  artificial	  virtues,	  Hume	  demonstrated	  that	  both	  the	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘moral’	  obligations	  to	  promise-­‐keeping	  and	  obedience	  to	  authority	  were	  entirely	  distinct,	  as	  were	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  human	  beings	  first	  invented,	  and	  then	  engaged	  in,	  such	  practices.	  One	  might	  as	  well	  resolve	  the	  convention	  of	  promise	  keeping	  into	  allegiance,	  as	  the	  other	  way	  around.71	  As	  for	  tacit	  consent,	  Hume	  lambasted	  this	  as	  simply	  a	  further	  absurdity.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  ‘what	  is	  given	  tacitly	  and	  insensibly	  can	  never	  have	  such	  influence	  on	  mankind,	  as	  what	  is	  perform’d	  expressly	  and	  openly’,	  thus	  drastically	  reducing	  the	  plausibility	  that	  tacit	  consent	  could	  provide	  sufficient	  basis	  for	  the	  erection	  of	  political	  authority.	  On	  the	  other,	  tacit	  consent	  presumed	  –	  at	  least	  if	  it	  was	  to	  have	  any	  meaningful	  content	  –	  the	  willed	  intention	  of	  the	  individual	  that	  signs	  other	  than	  explicit	  speech	  be	  taken	  as	  the	  giving	  of	  consent:	  ‘a	  will	  there	  must	  certainly	  be	  in	  the	  case,	  and	  can	  never	  escape	  the	  person’s	  notice,	  who	  exerted	  it,	  however	  silent	  or	  tacit’.	  Yet	  manifestly	  ‘were	  you	  to	  ask	  the	  greatest	  part	  of	  the	  nation,	  whether	  they	  had	  ever	  consented	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  rulers,	  or	  promis’d	  to	  obey	  them’	  they	  would	  think	  ‘very	  strangely	  of	  you’	  and	  reply	  that	  ‘the	  affair	  depended	  not	  on	  their	  consent,	  but	  that	  they	  were	  born	  to	  such	  obedience’.72	  Trying	  to	  get	  around	  this	  by	  saying	  that	  a	  person’s	  continued	  residency	  in	  a	  territory	  constituted	  consent	  to	  political	  authority	  was	  only	  a	  further	  absurdity.	  Could	  it	  be	  reasonable	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  poor	  peasant	  without	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.3;	  SBN	  542.	  71	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.4-­‐8;	  SBN	  543-­‐7;	  	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  pp.	  481-­‐2.	  72	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.9;	  SBN	  547-­‐8.	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means	  to	  emigrate	  nonetheless	  freely	  gave	  his	  willed	  and	  meaningful	  consent	  via	  continued	  residency?73	  Nobody	  not	  led	  astray	  by	  party	  frenzy	  could	  seriously	  maintain	  so,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  nobody	  had	  ever	  suggested	  the	  doctrine	  of	  tacit	  consent	  before	  the	  constitutional	  crises	  of	  the	  late	  seventeenth	  century,	  a	  sure	  sign	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  basis	  of	  authority	  in	  modern	  (or	  indeed	  any)	  conditions.74	  	  Hume’s	  task	  was	  made	  easy	  by	  his	  total	  disregarding	  of	  Locke’s	  juridical	  motivations	  in	  making	  tacit	  consent	  the	  normative	  lynchpin	  of	  his	  account	  of	  authority.	  Hume	  bypassed	  this	  central	  aspect	  of	  Locke’s	  theory	  –	  a	  casualty	  of	  his	  insistence	  on	  an	  entirely	  secular	  account	  of	  politics,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below	  –	  whilst	  torpedoing	  the	  vulgarized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  ideas	  which	  drew	  upon	  tacit	  consent	  not	  as	  a	  normative	  justification	  for	  authority	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  political	  Ur-­‐revolution,	  but	  as	  an	  empirical	  claim	  about	  the	  foundations	  of	  authority	  in	  present	  circumstances.	  This	  has	  led	  some	  of	  Locke’s	  more	  recent	  admirers	  to	  bemoan	  Hume’s	  arguments	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  engage	  with	  Locke’s	  most	  serious	  underlying	  position,	  supplying	  only	  a	  straw	  man	  version	  of	  his	  ideas	  easily	  put	  up	  for	  burning.75	  Yet	  whilst	  Hume’s	  presentation	  of	  his	  arguments	  is	  liable	  to	  give	  the	  impression	  of	  sloppy	  misrepresentation,	  further	  fuelling	  the	  suspicion	  that	  he	  lacks	  a	  theory	  of	  politics	  proper	  and	  offers	  only	  a	  political	  sociology,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  serious	  mistake	  to	  conclude	  that	  this	  is	  all	  he	  in	  fact	  supplies.	  Hume	  fully	  engaged	  the	  fundamental	  challenge	  bequeathed	  by	  Locke:	  the	  need	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  p.	  475.	  74	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.9;	  SBN	  547-­‐8;	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  Essays,	  pp.	  475-­‐7	  75	  Dunn,	  ‘Applied	  theology’,	  p.	  129;	  Brownsey,	  ‘Hume	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract’,	  p.	  145;	  Martyn	  P.	  Thompson,	  ‘Hume’s	  Critique	  of	  Locke	  and	  the	  “Original	  Contract”’,	  Il	  Pensiero	  Politico	  10:10	  (1977),	  pp.	  189-­‐201.	  Buckle	  and	  Castiglione,	  ‘Hume’s	  Critique	  of	  the	  Contract	  Theory’,	  defends	  Hume	  from	  the	  complaints	  Thompson	  advances,	  in	  a	  spirit	  similar	  to	  the	  argument	  advanced	  here.	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supply	  an	  alternative	  theory	  of	  authority	  which	  did	  away	  entirely	  with	  consent	  as	  the	  normative	  lynchpin	  within	  a	  theistic	  framework.	  Yet	  his	  response	  to	  Locke,	  unlike	  his	  direct	  reply	  to	  the	  popularized	  Lockeanism	  of	  his	  day,	  is	  offered	  by	  implication	  rather	  than	  direct	  engagement.	  It	  is	  revealed	  –	  and	  must	  ultimately	  be	  judged	  –	  by	  the	  coherence	  and	  upshot	  of	  his	  own	  rival	  positive	  account	  of	  authority,	  which	  if	  successful	  would	  entirely	  displace	  not	  just	  Locke’s	  conceptual	  edifice,	  but	  the	  fundamental	  worldview	  upon	  which	  it	  was	  predicated.	  It	  is	  that	  positive	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  we	  must	  therefore	  examine.	  
III	  –	  Utility	  and	  Authority	  Hume	  agreed	  with	  Locke	  that	  identifying	  the	  proper	  basis	  of	  authority	  required	  understanding	  its	  relation	  to	  utility.	  The	  appropriate	  point	  of	  analysis	  was	  the	  one	  Locke	  had	  identified:	  under	  what	  circumstances	  government	  was	  owed	  obedience,	  and	  when	  it	  forfeited	  a	  rightful	  claim	  of	  allegiance	  by	  prejudicing	  utility.	  Hume	  summarised	  the	  Lockean	  position	  concisely.	  Because	  government	  was	  an	  invention	  for	  the	  furthering	  of	  ‘protection	  and	  security’	  men	  would	  only	  reasonably	  consent	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  such	  government	  so	  long	  as	  these	  things	  were	  provided.	  If	  instead	  they	  were	  met	  with	  ‘tyranny	  and	  oppression’,	  they	  were	  ‘freed	  from	  their	  promises	  (as	  happens	  in	  all	  conditional	  contracts)	  and	  return	  to	  that	  state	  of	  liberty,	  which	  preceded	  the	  institution	  of	  government’.76	  Authority	  was	  conditional	  on	  utility:	  if	  government	  did	  not	  supply	  the	  latter,	  it	  forfeited	  the	  former.	  In	  times	  of	  crisis	  rebellion	  was	  therefore	  licensed,	  but	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.9.1;	  SBN	  549-­‐50.	  In	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  Hume	  added	  the	  insistence	  on	  natural	  equality	  to	  the	  secularized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  argument,	  which	  maintained	  that	  ‘all	  men	  are…born	  equal	  and	  owe	  allegiance	  to	  no	  prince	  or	  government	  unless	  bound	  by	  the	  obligation	  and	  sanction	  of	  a	  promise’:	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  p.	  469.	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times	  of	  stability	  obedience	  was	  owed.	  Hume	  did	  not	  question	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  argument	  was	  ‘perfectly	  just	  and	  reasonable’.77	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  ‘the	  conclusion	  is	  just,	  tho’	  the	  principles	  be	  erroneous’.	  The	  most	  erroneous	  principle	  of	  all	  was	  making	  the	  connection	  between	  utility	  and	  authority	  dependent	  upon	  a	  conditional	  promise	  given	  by	  the	  ruled	  –	  something	  which	  had	  never	  actually	  taken	  place,	  and	  which	  nobody	  other	  than	  party	  philosophers	  had	  ever	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  modern	  conditions.78	  By	  contrast,	  Hume	  believed	  that	  he	  could	  ‘establish	  the	  same	  conclusion	  on	  more	  reasonable	  principles’.79	  To	  do	  so	  he	  turned	  to	  his	  own	  theory	  of	  artificial	  virtues,	  coupled	  with	  observation	  of	  the	  actual	  psychological	  processes	  undergone	  by	  agents	  living	  under	  modern	  political	  rule.	  Allegiance,	  like	  justice,	  was	  attended	  with	  both	  a	  ‘natural’	  and	  a	  ‘moral’	  obligation.	  The	  natural	  obligation	  was	  straightforward	  and	  obvious.	  Being	  an	  artifice	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  utility,	  the	  ‘natural’	  obligation	  to	  obey	  government	  extended	  only	  so	  far	  as	  utility	  was	  indeed	  promoted:	  This	  interest	  I	  find	  to	  consist	  in	  the	  security	  and	  protection,	  which	  we	  enjoy	  in	  political	  society,	  and	  which	  we	  can	  never	  attain,	  when	  perfectly	  free	  and	  independent.	  As	  interest,	  therefore,	  is	  the	  immediate	  sanction	  of	  government,	  the	  one	  can	  have	  no	  longer	  being	  than	  the	  other;	  and	  whenever	  the	  civil	  magistrate	  carries	  his	  oppression	  so	  far	  as	  to	  render	  his	  authority	  perfectly	  intolerable,	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  bound	  to	  submit	  to	  it.80	  	  As	  well	  as	  making	  appeals	  to	  promising	  as	  a	  method	  of	  securing	  utility	  insufficiently	  parsimonious	  and	  explanatorily	  redundant,	  the	  natural	  obligation	  to	  allegiance	  explained	  why	  the	  Lockean	  conclusion	  that	  abusive	  governmental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.9.1;	  SBN	  549.	  78	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.8;	  SBN	  547.	  79	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.9.2;	  SBN	  550.	  80	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.9.2;	  SBN	  550-­‐1.	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power	  may	  legitimately	  be	  resisted	  was	  correct:	  ‘The	  cause	  ceases;	  the	  effect	  must	  cease	  also’.81	  But	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  ‘moral’	  obligation	  to	  obedience	  ‘the	  maxim	  wou’d	  here	  be	  false,	  that	  when	  the	  cause	  ceases,	  the	  effect	  must	  cease	  also’.	  It	  was	  readily	  observable	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  ‘mightily	  addicted	  to	  general	  rules,	  and	  that	  we	  often	  carry	  our	  maxims	  beyond	  those	  reasons,	  which	  first	  induc’d	  us	  to	  establish	  them’.82	  The	  moral	  obligation	  to	  allegiance	  out-­‐ran	  the	  natural.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  allegiance	  (like	  justice)	  took	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  moral	  virtue	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  the	  agreeableness	  and	  utility	  of	  which	  did	  not	  make	  direct	  recourse	  to	  calculations	  of	  individual	  interest,	  and	  was	  strengthened	  by	  sympathy	  with	  the	  public	  weal.	  The	  prospect	  of	  rebellion	  made	  one	  uneasy	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  oneself	  and	  one’s	  neighbours,	  and	  the	  typically	  vain	  and	  selfish	  ambitions	  of	  rebels	  were	  manifest	  to	  others,	  who	  accordingly	  found	  their	  actions	  disagreeable,	  likely	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  utility,	  and	  thus	  vicious	  –	  further	  strengthening	  the	  virtue	  of	  allegiance	  by	  comparison.83	  Established	  power	  received	  enhanced	  sanction	  from	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  established,	  and	  men	  were	  apt	  to	  tolerate	  infractions	  of	  their	  immediate	  interest	  (undermining	  their	  ‘natural’	  obligation	  to	  virtue)	  without	  this	  translating	  into	  a	  forfeiture	  of	  the	  ‘moral’	  obligation.84	  The	  basis	  of	  modern	  authority	  was	  thus	  a	  function	  of	  complex	  psychological	  processes	  supervening	  on	  the	  securing	  of	  interest,	  rather	  than	  being	  straightforwardly	  utilitarian:	  dependent	  upon	  the	  workings	  of	  human	  imagination	  in	  line	  with	  general	  rules	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.9.2;	  SBN	  550-­‐1.	  82	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.9.3;	  SBN	  551.	  83	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.3;	  SBN	  555.	  84	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.19;	  SBN	  566:	  ‘that	  power,	  which	  at	  first	  was	  founded	  only	  on	  injustice	  and	  violence,	  becomes	  in	  time	  legal	  and	  obligatory.	  Nor	  does	  the	  mind	  rest	  there;	  but	  returning	  back	  upon	  its	  footsteps,	  transfers	  to	  their	  predecessors	  and	  ancestors	  that	  right,	  which	  it	  naturally	  ascribes	  to	  the	  posterity,	  as	  being	  related	  together,	  and	  united	  in	  the	  imagination’.	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and	  sympathy	  with	  public	  utility,	  not	  the	  direct	  calculation	  of	  individual	  advantage.	  	  Men	  only	  gave	  up	  the	  ‘moral’	  obligation	  to	  obedience	  when	  the	  ‘general	  rule’	  of	  allegiance	  was	  confronted	  with	  an	  exception	  which	  itself	  had	  the	  qualities	  of	  a	  ‘general	  rule,	  and	  be	  founded	  on	  very	  numerous	  and	  common	  instances’.	  Although	  men	  fundamentally	  submit	  to	  the	  ‘authority	  of	  others’	  in	  order	  ‘to	  procure	  themselves	  some	  security	  against	  the	  wickedness	  and	  injustice	  of	  men’,	  nobody	  was	  naïve	  enough	  to	  believe	  that	  those	  appointed	  to	  rule	  thereby	  automatically	  transcended	  the	  partiality	  and	  rapaciousness	  that	  ordinary	  individuals	  were	  prone	  to.	  What	  was	  expected	  from	  rulers	  ‘depends	  not	  on	  a	  change	  of	  their	  nature	  but	  of	  their	  situation,	  when	  they	  acquire	  a	  more	  immediate	  interest	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  order	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  justice’.	  Nonetheless,	  separated	  from	  their	  subjects	  by	  wealth	  and	  power,	  rulers	  were	  apt	  to	  neglect	  even	  their	  immediate	  interest	  in	  providing	  the	  salus	  populi,	  instead	  being	  ‘transported	  by	  their	  passions	  into	  all	  the	  excesses	  of	  cruelty	  and	  ambition’.	  Awareness	  of	  these	  facts	  provided	  the	  ‘general	  rule’	  which	  could,	  in	  extreme	  enough	  circumstances,	  outweigh	  the	  general	  rules	  underpinning	  our	  ‘moral’	  obligation	  to	  obedience.	  ‘Our	  general	  knowledge	  of	  human	  nature,	  our	  observation	  of	  the	  past	  history	  of	  mankind,	  our	  experience	  of	  present	  times’	  all	  combined	  to	  yield	  the	  conclusion	  ‘that	  we	  may	  resist	  the	  more	  violent	  effects	  of	  supreme	  power,	  without	  any	  crime	  or	  injustice’.85	  Hume’s	  account	  received	  added	  credibility	  by	  being	  ‘both	  the	  general	  practice	  and	  principle	  of	  mankind’.	  Likewise,	  ‘no	  nation,	  that	  cou’d	  find	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.93;	  SBN	  551-­‐2.	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remedy,	  ever	  yet	  suffer’d	  the	  cruel	  ravages	  of	  a	  tyrant,	  or	  were	  blam’d	  for	  their	  resistance’.86	  The	  Tory	  doctrine	  of	  passive	  obedience	  was	  an	  ‘absurdity’,	  decisively	  revealed	  as	  such	  by	  reconfiguring	  the	  Lockean	  conclusion	  of	  a	  right	  of	  resistance	  on	  an	  empirically	  credible	  and	  intellectually	  coherent	  foundation.87	  When	  one	  got	  down	  to	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  what	  government	  was	  an	  invention	  for,	  ‘There	  evidently	  is	  no	  other	  principle	  than	  interest’.	  Accordingly,	  ‘if	  interest	  first	  produces	  obedience	  to	  government,	  the	  obligation	  to	  obedience	  must	  cease,	  whenever	  the	  interest	  ceases,	  in	  any	  great	  degree,	  and	  in	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  instances’.88	  Yet	  rebellion	  was	  sociologically	  a	  highly	  unusual	  phenomenon:	  men’s	  interests	  had	  to	  be	  pushed	  a	  very	  long	  way	  before	  they	  took	  up	  arms	  en	  masse,	  whilst	  the	  vain	  ambitions	  of	  rebels	  seeking	  self-­‐aggrandizement	  rather	  than	  the	  
salus	  populi	  met	  with	  the	  disapproval	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  populace.	  Furthermore	  it	  was	  ‘certain,	  that	  in	  the	  ordinary	  course	  of	  human	  affairs	  nothing	  can	  be	  more	  pernicious	  and	  criminal’	  than	  rebellion.	  Whilst	  ‘numerous	  and	  civiliz’d	  societies	  cannot	  subsist	  without	  government’,	  it	  was	  equally	  the	  case	  that	  ‘government	  is	  entirely	  useless	  without	  an	  exact	  obedience’.	  The	  means	  and	  end	  of	  government	  would	  be	  debilitated	  were	  men	  to	  withdraw	  obedience	  whenever	  they	  personally	  judged	  that	  it	  was	  in	  their	  interest	  to	  do	  so:	  We	  ought	  always	  to	  weigh	  the	  advantages,	  which	  we	  reap	  from	  authority,	  against	  the	  disadvantages;	  and	  by	  this	  means	  we	  shall	  become	  more	  scrupulous	  of	  putting	  in	  practice	  the	  doctrine	  of	  resistance.	  The	  common	  rule	  requires	  submission;	  and	  ’tis	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  grievous	  tyranny	  and	  oppression,	  that	  the	  exception	  can	  take	  place.89	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.9.4;	  SBN	  552.	  87	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.9.4;	  SBN	  552;	  cf.	  ‘Of	  Passive	  Obedience’,	  pp.	  489-­‐91.	  88	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.9.4;	  SBN	  553;	  cf.	  Hume,	  Enquiry,	  p.	  28.	  89	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.1;	  SBN	  553-­‐4,	  cf.	  ‘Of	  the	  original	  contract’,	  p.	  480.	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A	  ‘blind	  submission’	  was	  due	  to	  magistracy	  in	  all	  cases	  other	  than	  the	  extreme	  one	  of	  resistance	  to	  tyranny.90	  Implicit	  in	  Hume’s	  sociological	  analysis	  of	  allegiance	  and	  obligation	  is	  therefore	  a	  utilitarian	  justification	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  obedience	  in	  normal	  conditions,	  cashed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  likely	  disastrous	  effects	  of	  aggregated	  individual	  judgement.	  If	  the	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  obey	  was	  left	  to	  each	  individual	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  this	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  continued	  functioning	  of	  government,	  which	  required	  ‘blind	  submission’	  in	  the	  aggregate.91	  Hobbes’s	  conclusion	  had	  been	  just,	  though	  his	  principles	  erroneous:	  individual	  judgement	  was	  not	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  destructive	  confrontation,	  but	  its	  elimination	  was	  nonetheless	  a	  requirement	  for	  political	  obligation	  and	  the	  securing	  of	  obedience	  in	  modern	  conditions.	  Fortunately,	  the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  allegiance	  ensured	  that	  human	  beings	  spontaneously	  reconciled	  themselves	  to	  obedience,	  refraining	  from	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  judgement	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  ‘blind	  submission’	  in	  ordinary	  circumstances.	  Government	  power	  thus	  did	  not	  need	  to	  explicitly	  take	  over	  the	  function	  of	  individual	  judgement	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  continued	  political	  stability.	  	  Nonetheless	  the	  right	  of	  revolution	  was	  not	  something	  that	  could	  be	  clearly	  determined	  in	  advance	  by	  disgruntled	  individuals,	  or	  prescribed	  a	  priori	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.2;	  SBN	  554.	  91	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.1;	  SBN	  553-­‐4.	  Of	  course,	  this	  justification	  could	  only	  work	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  
aggregate,	  and	  could	  gain	  little	  traction	  with	  the	  solitary	  individual	  who	  pointed	  out	  that	  their	  particular	  act	  of	  self-­‐interested	  defection,	  if	  undetected	  and	  unpunished,	  would	  benefit	  themselves	  without	  brining	  down	  the	  social	  edifice.	  Regarding	  the	  problem	  of	  this	  ‘free	  rider’,	  as	  she	  came	  to	  be	  known	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  twentieth	  century	  political	  and	  economic	  scientists,	  see	  Richard	  Tuck,	  Free	  Riding	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  2008),	  chapter	  4	  of	  which	  explicitly	  examines	  Hume’s	  theory	  of	  artificial	  virtues.	  I	  do	  not,	  however,	  agree	  with	  Tuck’s	  reading,	  and	  suggest	  that	  Hume’s	  answer	  to	  the	  political	  free	  rider	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  paralleling	  that	  of	  his	  answer	  to	  the	  free-­‐riding	  ‘sensible	  knave’	  of	  the	  Second	  Enquiry:	  the	  self-­‐approval	  flowing	  from	  adherence	  to	  the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  allegiance	  is	  the	  reason	  individuals	  should	  ‘blindly	  submit’	  to	  government.	  Regarding	  Hume	  and	  the	  ‘sensible	  knave’,	  see	  Paul	  Sagar,	  ‘Minding	  the	  Gap:	  Bernard	  Williams	  and	  David	  Hume	  on	  Living	  an	  Ethical	  Life’,	  Journal	  of	  Moral	  Philosophy,	  11	  (2014)	  pp.	  615-­‐38.	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by	  the	  theorist.	  Although	  no	  reasonable	  person	  blamed	  subjects	  for	  overthrowing	  a	  Nero	  or	  a	  Philip	  II,	  this	  judgement	  was	  only	  admissible	  when	  made	  retrospectively.92	  Hume	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  right	  of	  revolution	  existed,	  but	  this	  was	  distinct	  from	  a	  right	  to	  openly	  promote	  revolution.	  Such	  action	  threatened	  to	  destabilize	  government	  by	  undermining	  the	  authority	  upon	  which	  it	  irreducibly	  depended.93	  If	  authority	  became	  genuinely	  forfeit	  due	  to	  assaults	  upon	  utility,	  revolution	  would	  (eventually)	  spontaneously	  occur.	  Political	  theory	  could	  not	  validate	  such	  spontaneity	  beyond	  its	  sociological	  manifestation	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  salus	  populi	  eventually	  eroding	  the	  imaginative	  basis	  of	  authority.	  Whilst	  revolutions	  could	  be	  legitimate,	  Hume’s	  philosophy	  told	  strongly	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  justificatory	  theory	  of	  a	  right	  
of	  revolution,	  one	  that	  could	  be	  appealed	  to	  over	  and	  above	  the	  interplay	  of	  utility	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  citizenry.	  The	  practice	  of	  politics	  in	  any	  given	  time	  and	  place,	  not	  the	  dictates	  of	  philosophy,	  should	  (and	  would)	  determine	  the	  conduct	  of	  a	  people	  with	  regards	  to	  tyrants.	  Indeed,	  Hume	  felt	  that	  sometimes	  the	  sentiments	  of	  the	  people	  tended	  too	  far	  towards	  authority	  and	  paradoxically	  threatened	  to	  undermine	  utility,	  as	  had	  occurred	  when	  the	  general	  citizenry	  of	  England	  had	  almost	  prevented	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  through	  a	  dogmatic	  loyalty	  to	  the	  dangerously	  reactionary	  James	  II.94	  By	  the	  mid-­‐eighteenth	  century,	  however,	  Hume	  saw	  the	  pendulum	  as	  swinging	  too	  far	  the	  other	  way:	  an	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  liberty	  by	  the	  victorious	  descendants	  of	  1688,	  coupled	  with	  the	  vulgar	  Lockean	  justification	  of	  a	  right	  of	  revolution,	  jeopardized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.9.4;	  SBN	  552.	  93	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Origin	  of	  Government’,	  in	  Essays,	  pp.	  37-­‐41,	  p.	  40.	  94	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.16-­‐19;	  SBN	  360-­‐2;	  Hont,	  ‘Smith’s	  History	  of	  Law	  and	  Government’,	  pp.	  151-­‐2;	  Forbes,	  Hume’s	  Philosophical	  Politics,	  pp.	  96-­‐8,	  139.	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the	  simultaneous	  maintenance	  of	  authority	  upon	  which	  all	  viable	  government	  depended.	  Hume’s	  ‘sceptical	  Whiggism’	  was	  a	  perspective	  urging	  a	  corrective	  to	  both	  excesses.95	  	  With	  the	  basis	  of	  authority	  accordingly	  delineated,	  the	  question	  arose	  as	  to	  whom	  obedience	  was	  due.	  Hume	  identified	  five	  bases	  upon	  which	  modern	  authority	  was	  granted,	  none	  of	  them	  founded	  upon	  an	  act	  of	  promising:	  long-­‐possession,	  present	  possession,	  conquest,	  succession,	  and	  positive	  law.96	  Again	  these	  were	  all	  determined	  more	  by	  human	  imagination	  –	  with	  a	  peculiar	  predilection	  for	  members	  of	  established	  ruling	  families	  –	  than	  by	  direct	  appeal	  to	  interest.97	  ‘The	  same	  interest….which	  causes	  us	  to	  submit	  to	  magistracy,	  makes	  us	  renounce	  itself	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  our	  magistrates,	  and	  binds	  us	  down	  to	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  government,	  and	  to	  particular	  persons,	  without	  allowing	  us	  to	  aspire	  to	  the	  utmost	  perfection	  in	  either’.	  Determining	  the	  ‘objects	  of	  allegiance’	  paralleled	  the	  conventions	  established	  for	  the	  government	  of	  possessions.	  It	  is	  ‘highly	  advantageous,	  and	  even	  absolutely	  necessary	  to	  society,	  that	  possession	  shou’d	  be	  stable;	  and	  this	  leads	  us	  to	  such	  a	  rule’.	  But	  were	  we	  to	  pursue	  that	  same	  advantage	  ‘in	  assigning	  particular	  possessions	  to	  particular	  persons,	  we	  shou’d	  disappoint	  our	  end,	  and	  perpetuate	  the	  confusion,	  which	  that	  end	  is	  intended	  to	  prevent’.	  Likewise,	  we	  come	  ‘to	  choose	  our	  magistrates	  without	  having	  in	  view	  any	  particular	  advantage	  from	  the	  choice’.98	  Deciding	  on	  the	  ‘objects’	  of	  allegiance	  in	  practice,	  as	  with	  analysis	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  authority	  more	  generally,	  was	  only	  indirectly	  a	  function	  of	  utility,	  being	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Forbes,	  Hume’s	  Philosophical	  Politics,	  chapter	  5.	  96	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.4-­‐14;	  SBN	  556-­‐62.	  97	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.11-­‐13;	  SBN	  559-­‐61.	  98	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.3;	  SBN	  555-­‐6.	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primarily	  dependent	  upon	  the	  ‘general	  rules’	  that	  influenced	  human	  imagination.	  In	  the	  terminology	  Hume	  would	  adopt	  after	  the	  Treatise,	  authority	  was	  therefore	  ultimately	  a	  function	  of	  ‘opinion’.	  It	  is	  ‘on	  opinion	  only	  that	  government	  is	  founded’,	  even	  in	  the	  most	  despotic	  and	  military	  governments,	  analytically	  decomposing	  into	  that	  of	  ‘interest’	  and	  of	  ‘right’	  (itself	  subdivided	  between	  that	  of	  ‘power’	  and	  ‘property’),	  corresponding	  to	  what	  the	  Treatise	  had	  labeled	  the	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘moral’	  obligation	  to	  allegiance.99	  Explicated	  in	  this	  manner,	  Hume’s	  account	  may	  indeed	  appear	  to	  offer	  only	  a	  sociology	  of	  politics.	  ‘Opinion’	  resembles	  the	  contemporary	  category	  of	  ‘public	  opinion’,	  and	  an	  empirically	  plausible	  sociological	  account	  of	  how	  and	  why	  men	  do	  or	  do	  not	  obey	  particular	  forms	  of	  rule	  is	  duly	  forthcoming.	  Yet	  the	  question	  of	  why	  obedience	  and	  authority	  are	  owed	  not	  just	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  psychological	  observation	  of	  how	  people	  are,	  but	  as	  a	  normative	  obligation	  over	  
and	  above	  contingent	  local	  practices	  –	  one	  which	  is	  binding	  upon	  citizens	  in	  all	  times	  outside	  of	  tyranny,	  and	  can	  be	  legitimately	  coercively	  extracted	  by	  rightful	  rulers	  –	  remains	  conspicuously	  outstanding.	  In	  short,	  despite	  the	  astuteness	  of	  his	  psychological	  account	  and	  his	  allowing	  for	  the	  justice	  of	  rebellion	  in	  times	  of	  tyrannical	  oppression,	  Hume	  apparently	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  outstanding	  philosophical	  issue:	  how	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  political	  obligation,	  a	  permanent	  feature	  of	  social	  organization	  under	  modern	  government,	  can	  be	  normatively	  
justified,	  rather	  than	  merely	  sociologically	  explained.	  Yet	  what	  we	  need	  to	  recognise	  is	  that	  Hume’s	  ‘sociology’	  is	  predicated	  upon	  an	  underlying	  philosophical	  worldview	  which	  rejects	  the	  possibility	  of	  external	  normative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Hume,	  ‘First	  Principles	  of	  Government’,	  pp.	  31-­‐4,	  cf.	  Dunn,	  ‘Applied	  Theology’,	  p.	  121:	  ‘Property,	  justice,	  allegiance,	  loyalty,	  duty,	  fidelity,	  all	  human	  rights	  and	  all	  human	  duties,	  are	  in	  the	  last	  instances	  functions	  of	  opinion’.	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justification	  as	  granted	  by	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  philosophy,	  and	  seeks	  to	  reconfigure	  our	  thinking	  about	  how	  to	  even	  pose,	  and	  then	  answer,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  political	  obligation	  can	  coherently	  consist	  of.	  Until	  that	  is	  realised	  we	  will	  radically	  underappreciate	  and	  misunderstand	  the	  nature	  and	  scale	  of	  Hume’s	  ambition,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  ‘sociology’.	  To	  do	  better	  we	  must	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  Hume’s	  conception	  of	  what	  philosophy	  is,	  and	  the	  little	  it	  can	  hope	  to	  achieve	  in	  practical	  matters.	  
IV	  –	  Opinion	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Philosophy	  On	  Locke’s	  account,	  God’s	  having	  creating	  men	  free	  and	  equal,	  and	  able	  to	  generate	  legitimate	  political	  authority	  only	  via	  the	  mechanism	  of	  consent,	  ensured	  that	  there	  was	  always	  an	  evaluative	  philosophical	  position	  external	  to	  particular	  human	  practices	  from	  which	  those	  practices	  could	  be	  judged,	  with	  specific	  arrangements	  impugned	  or	  justified	  accordingly.	  Hume	  entirely	  rejected	  this.100	  His	  wholly	  secular	  political	  theory	  contended	  that	  human	  political	  practice	  could	  only	  be	  judged	  from	  the	  inside,	  by	  its	  own	  standards	  and	  values.	  As	  he	  put	  it	  when	  concluding	  his	  case	  against	  the	  popular	  secularized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  position:	  Lest	  those	  arguments	  shou’d	  not	  appear	  entirely	  conclusive	  (as	  I	  think	  they	  are)	  I	  shall	  have	  recourse	  to	  authority,	  and	  shall	  prove,	  from	  the	  universal	  consent	  of	  mankind,	  that	  the	  obligation	  of	  submission	  to	  government	  is	  not	  deriv’d	  from	  any	  promise	  of	  the	  subjects.	  Nor	  need	  any	  one	  wonder,	  that	  tho’	  I	  have	  all	  along	  endeavour’d	  to	  establish	  my	  system	  on	  pure	  reason,	  and	  have	  scarce	  ever	  cited	  the	  judgment	  even	  of	  philosophers	  or	  historians	  on	  any	  article,	  I	  shou’d	  now	  appeal	  to	  popular	  authority,	  and	  oppose	  the	  sentiments	  of	  the	  rabble	  to	  any	  philosophical	  reasoning.	  For	  it	  must	  be	  observ’d,	  that	  the	  opinions	  of	  men,	  in	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Duncan	  Forbes,	  ‘Hume’s	  Science	  of	  Politics’,	  in	  David	  Hume:	  Bicentenary	  Papers,	  ed.	  G.P.	  Morice	  (Edinburgh,	  1977),	  pp.	  39-­‐50,	  pp.	  48-­‐9;	  cf.	  Buckle	  and	  Castiglione,	  ‘Hume	  and	  the	  Contract	  Theory’,	  pp.	  465-­‐69.	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case,	  carry	  with	  them	  a	  peculiar	  authority,	  and	  are,	  in	  a	  great	  measure,	  infallible.101	  	  Morality	  –	  which	  for	  Hume	  includes	  assessments	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  authority	  and	  obligation	  –	  ‘is	  founded	  on	  the	  pleasure	  or	  pain,	  which	  results	  from	  the	  view	  of	  any	  sentiment,	  or	  character’.	  Yet	  such	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  ‘cannot	  be	  unknown	  to	  the	  person	  who	  feels	  it’,	  hence	  there	  is	  only	  so	  much	  virtue	  or	  vice	  in	  any	  character	  or	  circumstance	  as	  one	  actually	  places	  in	  it.102	  Morality	  is	  a	  purely	  human	  construction,	  built	  out	  of	  the	  materials	  of	  natural	  sentiment	  (though	  it	  is	  no	  less	  real	  for	  being	  that).	  There	  is	  therefore	  only	  the	  internal	  perspective	  of	  sentiment	  from	  which	  to	  make	  moral	  and	  political	  judgements.	  But	  moreover,	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  that	  perspective	  are	  ipso	  facto	  ‘infallible’,	  because	  there	  just	  is	  no	  external	  perspective	  (such	  as	  God’s)	  from	  which	  to	  otherwise	  judge	  them.	  Likewise,	  it	  is	  impossible	  that	  with	  regards	  to	  what	  our	  sentiments	  find	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  in,	  we,	  as	  the	  sources	  and	  bearers	  of	  those	  sentiments,	  ‘can	  ever	  be	  mistaken’.103	  Errors	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  ‘origin’	  of	  vices	  or	  virtues,	  but	  not	  about	  whether	  things	  are	  vices	  or	  virtues	  to	  us.	  With	  specific	  regard	  to	  authority	  and	  obligation,	  and	  the	  attendant	  artificial	  virtue	  of	  allegiance,	  the	  question	  of	  importance	  is	  not	  about	  ‘origin’,	  but	  about	  ‘degree’:	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  believe	  ourselves	  obliged	  to	  authority,	  thus	  owing	  obedience	  in	  given	  circumstances.	  Hume’s	  conclusion,	  entailed	  by	  his	  underlying	  ethical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.8;	  SBN	  546.	  102	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.8;	  SBN	  546.	  103	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.8.8;	  SBN	  546.	  For	  a	  discussion	  (that	  is	  much	  more	  hostile	  to	  Hume	  in	  this	  area	  than	  I	  am)	  see	  Brownsey,	  ‘Hume	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract’	  pp.	  137-­‐40,	  147;	  for	  a	  counterview	  to	  Brownsey,	  see	  Buckle	  and	  Castiglione,	  ‘Hume’s	  critique	  of	  the	  contract	  theory’,	  pp.	  463-­‐69.	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sentimentalism,	  is	  that	  insofar	  as	  the	  opinion	  of	  mankind	  judges	  that	  some	  power	  possess	  authority	  and	  is	  owed	  obedience,	  it	  therefore	  does	  and	  is.104	  Locke	  would	  have	  entirely	  rejected	  Hume’s	  position.	  But	  the	  action	  of	  disagreement	  would	  have	  taken	  place	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  external	  position	  is	  possible	  with	  regards	  to	  normative	  assessment	  of	  our	  present	  practices,	  and	  hence	  ultimately	  over	  the	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  and	  what	  we	  can	  know	  He	  wills	  and	  commands.105	  The	  same	  could	  not	  be	  said	  for	  the	  vulgarized	  Lockean	  position	  Hume	  deliberately	  put	  up	  as	  his	  target	  in	  the	  
Treatise.	  Deliberately,	  because	  Hume’s	  science	  of	  man	  proceeded	  in	  entirely	  secular	  terms	  and	  hence	  he	  engaged	  not	  Locke’s	  argument	  proper,	  but	  only	  that	  version	  of	  it	  which	  could	  be	  admitted	  under	  the	  principles	  of	  experience	  and	  observation,	  excluding	  any	  underlying	  theism	  however	  essential	  for	  the	  coherence	  of	  a	  supervening	  account.106	  Hume	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  secularized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Hume’s	  approach,	  however,	  invites	  a	  serious	  worry	  about	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  belief	  in	  political	  legitimacy	  is	  generated.	  Even	  if	  legitimacy	  can	  only	  ultimately	  be	  judged	  internally,	  we	  nonetheless	  need	  some	  way	  of	  identifying	  illegitimate	  methods,	  and	  in	  turn	  outcomes,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  securing	  the	  psychological	  assent	  of	  citizens,	  both	  when	  judging	  the	  conditions	  of	  historical	  and	  geographical	  others,	  and	  in	  assessing	  our	  own	  practices	  to	  decide	  whether	  they	  generate	  belief	  in	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  right	  sort	  of	  way.	  Hume	  does	  not	  address	  himself	  to	  this	  important	  concern,	  but	  after	  the	  20th	  century	  and	  following	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  modern	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  manufacture	  consent	  via	  manipulation	  and	  intimidation,	  it	  cannot	  now	  be	  ignored.	  On	  precisely	  this	  point,	  however,	  see	  the	  importance	  that	  Bernard	  Williams	  assigns	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘Critical	  Theory	  Test’	  in	  his	  own	  Humean	  internalist	  political	  theory,	  i.e.	  the	  requirement	  that	  belief	  in	  a	  regime’s	  legitimacy	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  function	  of	  the	  very	  power	  being	  putatively	  legitimated.	  Bernard	  Williams,	  Truth	  and	  Truthfulness:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Genealogy	  (Prinecton,	  N.J.,	  2002),	  chapter	  9,	  and	  also	  the	  essays	  collected	  in	  In	  The	  Beginning	  Was	  the	  Deed,	  ed.	  G.	  Hawthorn	  (Princeton,	  N.J.,	  2005).	  See	  also	  Edward	  Hall,	  ‘The	  Basic	  Legitimation	  Demand:	  A	  Defence’,	  
Political	  Studies	  (forthcoming),	  and	  Paul	  Sagar,	  ‘From	  Scepticism	  to	  Liberalism:	  Bernard	  Williams,	  The	  Foundations	  of	  Liberalism,	  and	  Political	  Realism’,	  Political	  Studies	  (forthcoming).	  	  105	  Hume	  would	  likely	  have	  had	  the	  better	  of	  that	  argument,	  as	  indicated	  by	  his	  posthumously	  published	  Dialogues	  Concerning	  Natural	  Religion.	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  power	  of	  Hume’s	  position	  in	  this	  work,	  see	  Simon	  Blackburn,	  How	  to	  Read	  Hume	  (London,	  2008),	  chapter	  8.	  106	  We	  thus	  need	  to	  qualify	  Dunn’s	  statement	  that	  Hume	  was	  not	  ‘at	  all	  a	  careful	  critic	  of	  Locke’s	  text’	  and	  does	  not	  ‘appear	  to	  have	  grasped	  even	  the	  essentials	  of	  its	  argument’	  though	  he	  ‘certainly	  mounts	  an	  intellectual	  and	  polemically	  effective	  enough	  critique	  of	  vulgar	  Whig	  shibboleths’:	  Dunn,	  ‘Applied	  Theology’,	  p.	  129,	  cf.	  Thompson,	  ‘Hume’s	  Critique	  of	  Locke	  and	  the	  “Original	  Contract”’.	  Whether	  or	  not	  Hume	  was	  a	  careful	  reader	  of	  Locke	  becomes	  beside	  the	  point	  when	  we	  realise	  that	  his	  entire	  intellectual	  project	  in	  the	  Treatise	  was	  to	  conduct	  an	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version	  of	  Locke’s	  view	  collapsed	  into	  incoherence	  when	  attempting	  to	  retain	  the	  external	  justificatory	  philosophical	  perspective	  whilst	  lacking	  the	  theocentric	  
weltanschauung	  required	  to	  make	  it	  coherent.	  The	  most	  telling	  sign	  of	  this	  was	  the	  generation	  of	  absurd	  conclusions:	  Any	  one,	  who	  finding	  the	  impossibility	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  right	  of	  the	  present	  possessor,	  by	  any	  receiv’d	  system	  of	  ethics,	  shou’d	  resolve	  to	  deny	  absolutely	  that	  right,	  and	  assert,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  authoriz’d	  by	  morality,	  wou’d	  be	  justly	  thought	  to	  maintain	  a	  very	  extravagant	  paradox,	  and	  to	  shock	  the	  common	  sense	  and	  judgment	  of	  mankind.	  No	  maxim	  is	  more	  conformable,	  both	  to	  prudence	  and	  morals,	  than	  to	  submit	  quietly	  to	  the	  government,	  which	  we	  find	  establish’d	  in	  the	  country	  where	  we	  happen	  to	  live,	  without	  enquiring	  too	  curiously	  into	  its	  origin	  and	  first	  establishment.	  Few	  governments	  will	  bear	  being	  examin’d	  so	  rigorously.	  How	  many	  kingdoms	  are	  there	  at	  present	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  how	  many	  more	  do	  we	  find	  in	  history,	  whose	  governors	  have	  no	  better	  foundation	  for	  their	  authority	  than	  that	  of	  present	  possession?107	  	  Taking	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Grecian	  and	  Roman	  empires,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  all	  titles	  in	  these	  periods	  were	  founded	  upon,	  and	  maintained	  by,	  violence:	  it	  ‘was	  by	  the	  sword…that	  every	  emperor	  acquir’d,	  as	  well	  as	  defended	  his	  right’.	  Accordingly,	  we	  must	  ‘either	  say,	  that	  all	  the	  known	  world,	  for	  so	  many	  ages,	  had	  no	  government,	  and	  ow’d	  no	  allegiance	  to	  any	  one	  or	  must	  allow,	  that	  the	  right	  of	  the	  stronger,	  in	  public	  affairs,	  is	  to	  be	  receiv’d	  as	  legitimate,	  and	  authoriz’d	  by	  morality,	  when	  not	  oppos’d	  by	  any	  other	  title’.108	  It	  was	  absurd	  to	  insist	  that	  government	  founded	  upon	  the	  sword	  rather	  than	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  ruled	  was	  no	  government	  at	  all	  (and	  hence	  owed	  no	  obedience),	  simply	  because	  such	  a	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  investigation	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘experience	  and	  observation’,	  meaning	  theocentric	  political	  theory	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  outset,	  to	  be	  entirely	  replaced	  by	  Hume’s	  alternative	  secular	  philosophical	  worldview.	  	  107	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.7;	  SBN	  558.	  108	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.7;	  SBN	  558.	  Hume	  extended	  his	  list	  of	  examples	  in	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  pp.	  483-­‐5.	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government	  did	  not	  conform	  to	  one’s	  preferred	  philosophical	  tenets.	  Any	  philosophy	  that	  maintained	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  government	  owed	  obedience	  in	  the	  Graeco-­‐Roman	  world	  did	  not	  offer	  a	  credible	  account	  of	  authority	  and	  obligation.	  The	  correct	  response	  was	  to	  find	  a	  better	  philosophy,	  one	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  evident	  realities	  of	  the	  world.109	  
Indeed,	  Hume	  urged	  more	  than	  just	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  better	  philosophy:	  he	  aimed	  to	  call	  into	  question,	  and	  then	  realign,	  our	  underlying	  conception	  of	  what	  political	  philosophy	  is	  and	  can	  do.	  If	  one	  viewed	  the	  role	  of	  political	  philosophy	  as	  being	  the	  issuing	  of	  pronouncements	  as	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  human	  social	  practices,	  predicated	  upon	  an	  external	  and	  ultimately	  superior	  standard	  of	  justification,	  whilst	  specifically	  making	  consent	  the	  condition	  by	  which	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  authority	  was	  achieved,	  then	  one	  must	  claim	  that	  any	  government	  not	  actually	  consented	  to	  by	  its	  population	  was	  ipso	  facto	  illegitimate.	  As	  Hume	  demonstrated,	  the	  consequence	  of	  this	  was	  to	  end	  up	  committed	  to	  the	  absurd	  conclusion	  that	  all	  government	  everywhere	  is,	  and	  has	  always	  been	  (at	  least	  after	  the	  first	  age	  of	  primitive	  founding),	  illegitimate.110	  Locke	  avoided	  such	  an	  embarrassing	  conclusion	  by	  appealing	  to	  tacit	  consent	  not	  as	  an	  empirical	  claim	  about	  how	  authority	  was	  actually	  generated	  in	  practice,	  but	  as	  a	  normative	  mechanism	  for	  securing	  the	  sanction	  of	  external	  justificatory	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  historic	  re-­‐foundation	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  ‘The	  necessities	  of	  human	  society,	  neither	  in	  private	  nor	  public	  life,	  will	  allow	  of	  such	  an	  accurate	  enquiry:	  And	  as	  there	  is	  no	  virtue	  or	  moral	  duty,	  but	  what	  may,	  with	  facility,	  be	  refined	  away,	  if	  we	  indulge	  a	  false	  philosophy,	  in	  sifting	  and	  scrutinizing	  it,	  by	  every	  captious	  rule	  of	  logic,	  in	  every	  light	  or	  position,	  in	  which	  it	  may	  be	  placed’:	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  p.	  482.	  For	  a	  view	  resistant	  to	  Hume’s	  urging	  that	  we	  adopt	  a	  new	  philosophy,	  because	  rejecting	  of	  Hume’s	  underlying	  attempted	  reconfiguration	  of	  what	  political	  philosophy	  is	  and	  can	  hope	  to	  be,	  see	  P.F.	  Brownsey,	  ‘Hume	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract’.	  110	  Hume	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  such	  a	  conclusion	  as	  the	  advancing	  of	  ‘absurdities’:	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  p.	  470.	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otherwise	  required	  to	  validate	  present	  arrangements.111	  But	  the	  secularized	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  argument	  –	  which	  treated	  tacit	  consent	  not	  as	  a	  normative	  justification	  within	  a	  theistic	  juridical	  framework,	  but	  as	  a	  descriptive	  empirical	  claim	  about	  the	  actual	  basis	  of	  present	  authority	  in	  modern	  conditions	  –	  collapsed	  into	  absurdity.	  Because	  tacit	  consent	  was	  itself	  a	  manifest	  absurdity	  as	  an	  empirical	  proposition,	  secular	  Lockeans	  were	  confronted	  with	  a	  dilemma.	  Either	  maintain	  their	  system	  upon	  the	  absurdity	  of	  tacit	  consent,	  or	  claim	  that	  because	  no	  modern	  government	  ever	  in	  fact	  received	  authority	  by	  express	  consent,	  then	  all	  modern	  government	  was	  illegitimate	  and	  thus	  not	  owed	  obedience.112	  This	  latter	  conclusion	  was	  also	  itself	  absurd,	  however,	  because	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  governmental	  authority	  was	  not	  something	  determined	  by	  the	  theories	  of	  philosophers,	  but	  by	  the	  opinion	  of	  mankind	  rooted	  in	  moral	  sentiment.	  Though	  ‘an	  appeal	  to	  general	  opinion	  may	  justly,	  in	  the	  speculative	  sciences	  of	  metaphysics,	  natural	  philosophy,	  or	  astronomy,	  be	  deemed	  unfair	  and	  inconclusive’	  by	  contrast	  ‘in	  all	  questions	  with	  regard	  to	  morals,	  as	  well	  as	  criticism,	  there	  is	  really	  no	  other	  standard	  by	  which	  any	  controversy	  can	  ever	  be	  decided’.113	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  By	  asking	  rhetorically	  of	  his	  opponents	  ‘how	  came	  so	  many	  lawful	  Monarchies	  into	  the	  World?’,	  Locke	  indicated	  that	  he	  believed	  legitimate	  government	  was	  the	  norm,	  not	  the	  exception:	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  344,	  §113.	  	  112	  This	  dilemma	  remains	  for	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  maintain	  a	  secular	  Lockeanism	  in	  present	  political	  theory.	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  for	  example,	  takes	  the	  second	  horn	  and	  concludes	  that	  because	  no	  present	  government	  has	  in	  fact	  been	  consented	  to	  by	  anything	  like	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  its	  citizens,	  no	  government	  in	  the	  world	  can	  presently	  be	  considered	  legitimate:	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  ‘Justification	  and	  Legitimacy’,	  in	  Justification	  and	  Legitimacy,	  pp.	  122-­‐57,	  p.	  155-­‐6.	  A	  similar	  view	  is	  taken	  by	  P.F.	  Brownsey,	  who	  claims	  that	  ‘If	  history	  discloses	  no	  social	  contracts	  in	  the	  histories	  of	  actual	  governments,	  the	  contract	  theorist	  can	  simply	  conclude	  “so	  much	  the	  worse	  for	  the	  governments	  of	  this	  world;	  none	  of	  them	  is	  legitimate”’:	  Brownsey,	  ‘Hume	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract’,	  p.	  133.	  This	  conclusion	  may	  be	  met	  by	  Hume’s	  heirs	  today	  with	  the	  same	  response	  Hume	  urged:	  that	  it	  is	  to	  put	  the	  cart	  of	  theory	  before	  the	  horse	  of	  political	  practice,	  and	  to	  render	  one’s	  philosophical	  position,	  and	  indeed	  one’s	  entire	  philosophical	  outlook,	  absurd	  as	  a	  consequence.	  For	  an	  illustration,	  see	  Hall,	  ‘A	  Defence’,	  pp.	  3-­‐4,	  10.	  	  113	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  p.	  486.	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Hume	  illustrated	  this	  with	  the	  example	  of	  absolute	  government.	  By	  furthering	  utility	  and	  receiving	  the	  allegiance	  of	  the	  subjects	  who	  judged	  it	  to	  have	  authority,	  absolute	  rule	  was	  ‘as	  natural	  and	  common	  a	  government	  as	  any’,	  and	  hence	  ‘must	  certainly	  occasion	  some	  obligation;	  and	  ’tis	  plain	  from	  experience,	  that	  men,	  who	  are	  subjected	  to	  it,	  do	  always	  think	  so’.114	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  subjects	  ‘do	  always	  think	  so’	  means	  that	  obligation	  was	  therefore	  owed	  by	  subjects	  under	  such	  conditions,	  there	  being	  no	  other	  coherent	  standard	  from	  which	  to	  judge.	  If	  secular	  Lockeans	  continued	  to	  decry	  absolute	  government	  as	  no	  government	  at	  all,	  insisting	  that	  their	  philosophy	  was	  right,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  the	  world	  that	  needed	  to	  change	  in	  line	  with	  the	  dictates	  of	  their	  speculations,	  this	  only	  confirmed	  and	  enhanced	  their	  absurdity.	  Nothing	  ‘is	  a	  clearer	  proof,	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  erroneous,	  than	  to	  find,	  that	  it	  leads	  to	  paradoxes,	  repugnant	  to	  the	  common	  sentiments	  of	  mankind,	  and	  to	  the	  practice	  and	  opinion	  of	  all	  nations	  and	  ages’.115	  Hume’s	  outlook,	  unlike	  that	  of	  a	  secularized	  Lockeanism,	  fully	  recognised,	  indeed	  embraced,	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘if	  we	  remount	  to	  the	  first	  origin	  of	  every	  nation,	  we	  shall	  find,	  that	  there	  scarce	  is	  any	  race	  of	  kings,	  or	  form	  of	  a	  commonwealth,	  that	  is	  not	  primarily	  founded	  on	  usurpation	  and	  rebellion,	  and	  whose	  title	  is	  not	  far	  worse	  than	  doubtful	  and	  uncertain’.116	  The	  lesson	  to	  draw	  was	  not	  that	  all	  government	  was	  therefore	  illegitimate,	  but	  that	  we	  must	  ‘learn	  to	  treat	  very	  lightly	  all	  disputes	  concerning	  the	  rights	  of	  princes’,	  becoming	  ‘convinc’d	  that	  a	  strict	  adherence	  to	  any	  general	  rules…hold	  less	  of	  reason,	  than	  of	  bigotry	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.8.9;	  SBN	  549,	  cf.	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  pp.	  486-­‐7.	  115	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  p.	  486.	  116	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.4;	  SBN	  556,	  cf.	  ‘Of	  the	  Original	  Contract’,	  pp.	  474-­‐5.	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superstition’.117	  In	  real	  political	  practice	  philosophy	  had	  almost	  no	  power	  to	  determine	  serious	  controversies	  over	  authority,	  which	  were	  themselves	  not	  usually	  amenable	  to	  purely	  intellectual	  resolution	  anyway:	  the	  ‘study	  of	  history	  confirms	  the	  reasonings	  of	  true	  philosophy;	  which,	  showing	  us	  the	  original	  qualities	  of	  human	  nature,	  teaches	  us	  to	  regard	  the	  controversies	  in	  politics	  as	  incapable	  of	  any	  decision	  in	  most	  cases,	  and	  as	  entirely	  subordinate	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  peace	  and	  liberty’.	  Indeed,	  ‘when	  these	  titles	  are	  mingled	  and	  oppos’d	  in	  different	  degrees,	  they	  often	  occasion	  perplexity;	  and	  are	  less	  capable	  of	  solution	  from	  the	  arguments	  of	  lawyers	  and	  philosophers,	  than	  from	  the	  swords	  of	  the	  soldiery’.118	  	  Hume’s	  point	  was	  double-­‐edged:	  not	  only	  was	  philosophy	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  resolve	  real	  disputes	  over	  authority,	  which	  usually	  revealed	  no	  single	  correct	  answer	  but	  only	  a	  plethora	  of	  competing	  claims,	  it	  would	  never	  be	  the	  decisive	  factor	  even	  if	  it	  could,	  per	  impossible,	  reveal	  a	  final	  unitary	  answer.119	  In	  turn,	  rather	  than	  bemoaning	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  real	  world	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  live	  up	  to	  one’s	  preferred	  philosophy,	  one	  would	  be	  better	  off	  rethinking	  one’s	  philosophy	  so	  that	  it	  better	  fitted	  the	  real	  world,	  and	  the	  actually	  existing	  conclusions	  of	  common	  sentiment,	  which	  gave	  the	  only	  genuine	  conditions	  of	  meaning	  and	  coherence	  one	  was	  ever	  going	  to	  get.	  Philosophy’s	  role	  was	  to	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  our	  state	  of	  affairs,	  in	  particular	  to	  better	  appreciate	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  values,	  whilst	  being	  aware	  that	  such	  values	  must,	  and	  could	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.15;	  SBN	  562.	  118	  Ibid.,	  T.3.2.10.15;	  SBN	  562.	  119	  As	  Hume	  later	  put	  it,	  ‘the	  Empire	  of	  philosophy	  extends	  over	  a	  few;	  and	  with	  regard	  to	  these	  too,	  her	  authority	  is	  very	  weak	  and	  limited’:	  Hume,	  ‘The	  Sceptic’,	  Essays,	  pp.	  159-­‐81,	  p.	  169.	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ever	  be,	  our	  own	  creations.120	  As	  regards	  practical	  politics,	  ‘I	  am	  afraid	  we	  shall	  never	  be	  able	  to	  satisfy	  any	  impartial	  enquirer,	  who	  adopts	  no	  party	  in	  political	  controversies,	  and	  will	  be	  satisfy’d	  with	  nothing	  but	  sound	  reason	  and	  philosophy’.121	  Yet	  whilst	  Hume’s	  philosophical	  outlook	  repudiated	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  external	  justificatory	  perspective,	  it	  was	  nonetheless	  firmly	  vindicatory	  of	  established	  human	  political	  practice	  in	  propitious	  circumstances,	  whilst	  by	  the	  same	  lights	  accounting	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  altering	  those	  circumstances	  through	  violent	  means	  if	  necessary	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  salus	  populi.	  Government	  was	  an	  invention	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  utility,	  garnering	  authority	  insofar	  as	  the	  human	  agents	  living	  under	  its	  arrangements	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  did	  indeed	  possess	  such	  authority.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  question	  of	  political	  obligation	  –	  the	  need	  to	  obey	  government	  outside	  conditions	  of	  tyranny,	  and	  non-­‐tyrannical	  government’s	  legitimate	  right	  to	  extract	  obedience	  by	  coercion	  if	  necessary	  –	  could	  be	  given	  a	  positive	  and	  clear	  answer,	  which	  vindicated	  rather	  than	  condemned	  the	  general	  practice	  of	  mankind.	  Obedience	  was	  owed	  when	  a	  people	  thought	  that	  it	  was,	  and	  could	  (and	  eventually	  would)	  be	  withdrawn	  when	  a	  people	  believed	  that	  it	  ceased	  to	  be	  owed,	  i.e.	  when	  their	  interests	  were	  sufficiently	  damaged	  by	  governmental	  oppression	  such	  that	  the	  ‘moral’	  obligation	  to	  allegiance	  ceased	  to	  outrun	  the	  ‘natural’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Indeed,	  excessive	  philosophical	  thinking	  in	  matters	  of	  real	  political	  dispute	  was	  liable	  to	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good,	  exacerbating	  rather	  than	  resolving	  conflicts	  as	  sound	  reasoning	  was	  twisted	  to	  the	  ends	  of	  party	  prejudice.	  In	  the	  History	  of	  England	  Hume	  warned	  against	  appeal	  to	  a	  mythical	  ancient	  constitution	  in	  attempts	  to	  vindicate	  present	  political	  change.	  The	  ‘only	  rule	  of	  government,	  which	  is	  intelligible	  or	  carries	  any	  authority	  with	  it,	  is	  the	  established	  practice	  of	  the	  age’,	  whereas	  those	  ‘who,	  from	  a	  pretended	  respect	  to	  antiquity,	  appeal	  at	  every	  turn	  to	  an	  original	  plan	  of	  the	  constitution,	  only	  cover	  their	  turbulent	  spirit	  and	  their	  private	  ambition	  under	  the	  appearance	  of	  venerable	  forms’:	  Hume,	  History	  of	  England,	  II,	  p.	  525.	  121	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.3.2.10.15;	  SBN	  563.	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Hume’s	  account	  was	  sociological	  in	  its	  surface	  manifestation	  only,	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  philosophical	  reconfiguration	  he	  simultaneously	  sought	  to	  bring	  about.	  Rather	  than	  avoiding	  the	  crucial	  normative	  issues	  surrounding	  political	  obligation,	  he	  presented	  these	  as	  coherently	  intelligible	  only	  from	  within	  the	  internal	  perspective	  generated	  by	  human	  political	  practice.	  This	  yielded	  the	  possibility	  of	  natural	  authority:	  possessing	  no	  external	  justification,	  but	  built	  upon	  a	  science	  of	  man	  that	  denied	  the	  coherence	  or	  need	  for	  any	  such	  justification	  anyway.	  It	  was	  this	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  political	  philosophy	  that	  Adam	  Smith	  followed	  Hume	  in	  adopting	  as	  the	  underlying	  normative	  framework	  for	  conceiving	  of	  authority	  in	  entirely	  secular	  terms.122	  What	  Hume	  had	  left	  outstanding	  was	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  how	  natural	  authority	  had	  been	  generated	  in	  the	  specific	  historical	  experience	  of	  ancient	  and	  then	  modern	  Europe.	  This	  was	  the	  contribution	  made	  by	  Smith’s	  history	  of	  law	  and	  government.	  
V	  -­‐	  Conclusion	  We	  may	  usefully	  conclude	  by	  reconnecting	  this	  evaluation	  of	  Hume’s	  underlying	  philosophical	  ambitions	  with	  the	  question	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  Hume’s	  wholesale	  omission	  of	  any	  such	  category.	  Sovereignty	  theory	  is	  fundamentally	  justification	  theory:	  it	  seeks	  to	  explain	  not	  only	  who	  has	  (or	  should	  have)	  ultimate	  political	  decision-­‐making	  power,	  but	  more	  fundamentally	  who	  has	  (or	  should	  have)	  the	  legitimate	  authority	  to	  exercise	  that	  power.	  The	  sovereign,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Although	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  Smith	  shared	  Hume’s	  optimism	  at	  the	  final	  prospects	  for	  such	  a	  secular	  normative	  theory.	  As	  he	  put	  it	  in	  the	  final	  revisions	  to	  his	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments,	  ‘the	  very	  suspicion	  of	  a	  fatherless	  world,	  must	  be	  the	  most	  melancholy	  of	  all	  reflections;	  from	  the	  thought	  that	  all	  the	  unknown	  regions	  of	  infinite	  and	  incomprehensible	  space	  may	  be	  filled	  with	  nothing	  but	  endless	  misery	  and	  wretchedness.	  All	  the	  splendour	  of	  the	  highest	  prosperity	  can	  never	  enlighten	  the	  gloom	  with	  which	  so	  dreadful	  an	  idea	  must	  necessarily	  over-­‐shadow	  the	  imagination’.	  Smith,	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments,	  p.	  235;	  cf.	  Dunn,	  ‘Applied	  Theology’,	  p.	  128.	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sovereign,	  is	  justified	  in	  using	  coercive	  force	  against	  those	  who	  do	  not	  obey	  his	  or	  her	  or	  its	  rightful	  authority,	  whilst	  those	  subject	  to	  sovereign	  power	  are	  not	  justified	  in	  resisting	  that	  sovereign’s	  directions	  or	  impositions,	  insofar	  as	  these	  fall	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  that	  rightful	  authority.	  	  Since	  at	  least	  Hobbes	  we	  have	  been	  accustomed	  to	  seeing	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  necessary	  feature	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  politics,	  and	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  in	  particular.	  Hobbes	  represents	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  case,	  because	  he	  seeks	  to	  provide	  a	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  with	  recourse	  only	  to	  materials	  available	  from	  within	  a	  secular	  political	  theoretic	  framework.123	  His	  is	  justification	  theory,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  posit	  any	  external	  justificatory	  ground	  by	  which	  human	  political	  practice	  is	  to	  be	  assessed.	  Hobbes	  attempted	  this	  by	  making	  consent	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  his	  theory:	  the	  sovereign	  was	  such	  because	  all	  had	  consented	  to	  be	  held	  in	  awe	  by	  common	  power,	  even	  if	  such	  consent	  happened	  to	  be	  given	  in	  the	  utmost	  extremes	  of	  duress.124	  Yet	  the	  expansive	  understanding	  of	  consent	  Hobbes	  relied	  upon	  to	  generate	  a	  purely	  internal	  standard	  of	  justification	  for	  sovereignty	  was	  predicated	  for	  its	  coherence	  upon	  his	  radically	  reductive	  view	  of	  freedom	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Although	  Hobbes	  certainly	  recognised	  that	  his	  secular	  theory	  of	  politics	  must	  be	  squared	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  historical	  and	  sociological	  fact	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  hence	  the	  third	  part	  of	  De	  Cive,	  ‘Of	  Religion’,	  and	  the	  third	  book	  of	  Leviathan,	  ‘Of	  Christian	  Commonwealth’.	  But	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  specific	  application	  of	  political	  science	  to	  contingent	  circumstances.	  	  124	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  II,	  pp.	  306-­‐8,	  312,	  326.	  The	  effect	  was	  heightened	  in	  Leviathan	  by	  adding	  the	  conception	  of	  ‘authorization’,	  whereby	  subjects	  individually	  came	  to	  own	  all	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  sovereign	  as	  their	  representative:	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  II,	  pp.	  244-­‐52.	  Yet	  the	  theory	  of	  authorization	  is	  imposed	  by	  Hobbes	  via	  conceptual	  fiat:	  highly	  useful	  as	  it	  may	  be	  for	  his	  purposes	  within	  his	  deeply	  impressive	  conceptual	  edifice	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  no	  reason	  whatsoever,	  other	  than	  Hobbes’s	  insistence,	  to	  accept	  the	  legalistic	  analogy	  by	  which	  consent	  equates	  to	  authorization	  and	  renders	  a	  representative	  an	  extension	  of	  one’s	  own	  causal	  actions,	  and	  particularly	  when	  it	  generates	  the	  absolutist	  conclusions	  Hobbes	  aspired	  to.	  On	  the	  wider	  background	  to	  Hobbes	  theory	  of	  representation,	  and	  its	  place	  in	  the	  modern	  political	  theory	  of	  representation,	  see	  Mónica	  Brito	  Vieira	  and	  David	  Runciman,	  Representation	  (Cambridge,	  2008),	  chapters	  1-­‐2.	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absence	  of	  physical	  impediments	  to	  movement.125	  Insofar	  as	  one	  is	  unconvinced	  of	  the	  coherence	  or	  plausibility	  of	  that	  view,	  one	  will	  be	  doubtful	  that	  consent	  can	  in	  fact	  play	  the	  crucial	  role	  Hobbes	  assigns	  to	  it	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  sovereignty,	  or	  in	  the	  justificatory	  ambitions	  his	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  embodies.126	  	  Furthermore,	  Hobbes’s	  absolutist	  vision	  failed	  –	  as	  both	  Locke	  and	  Hume	  recognised	  –	  to	  properly	  configure	  the	  balance	  between	  utility	  and	  authority.	  Hobbes	  correctly	  identified	  that	  the	  primary	  task	  of	  the	  state	  was	  the	  provision	  of	  order	  and	  security,	  but	  he	  radically	  over-­‐estimated	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  internal	  dissention	  whilst	  underestimating	  that	  posed	  by	  the	  rapacity	  of	  rulers.	  His	  system	  granted	  too	  much	  to	  authority,	  dangerously	  imperiling	  utility.	  As	  Locke	  famously	  remarked,	  to	  agree	  with	  Hobbes	  would	  be	  to	  think	  that	  ‘Men	  are	  so	  foolish	  that	  they	  take	  care	  to	  avoid	  what	  Mischiefs	  may	  be	  done	  them	  by	  Pole-­‐
Cats,	  or	  Foxes,	  but	  are	  content,	  nay	  think	  it	  Safety,	  to	  be	  devoured	  by	  Lions’,	  a	  sentiment	  shared	  by	  Hume,	  and	  facilitated	  in	  both	  cases	  by	  less	  bellicose	  conceptions	  of	  human	  sociability.127	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  For	  a	  helpful	  and	  clear	  discussion	  see	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  Hobbes	  and	  Republican	  Liberty	  (Cambridge,	  2008),	  chapter	  6.	  126	  Hume	  was	  clearly	  sceptical	  of	  anything	  like	  Hobbes’s	  minimalist	  negative	  view	  of	  freedom,	  as	  revealed	  by	  his	  discussion	  of	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  liberty	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  power	  of	  others	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  restrained	  by	  law:	  Hume,	  Treatise,	  T.2.1.10.1-­‐12;	  SBN	  309-­‐16.	  Recent	  commentators	  have	  illustrated	  the	  implausibility	  of	  Hobbes’s	  purely	  negative	  view	  of	  liberty.	  See	  for	  example	  Philip	  Pettit,	  Republicanism:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Freedom	  and	  Government	  (Oxford,	  1997),	  chapters	  1-­‐4;	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  ‘The	  Idea	  of	  Negative	  Liberty’,	  in	  Philosophy	  of	  History:	  Essays	  on	  the	  
Historiography	  of	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  R.	  Rorty	  and	  J.B.	  Schneewind	  (Cambridge,	  1984),	  pp.	  193-­‐221;	  
Liberty	  Before	  Liberalism	  (Cambridge,	  1998);	  ‘Freedom	  as	  the	  Absence	  of	  Arbitrary	  Power’,	  in	  
Republicanism	  and	  Political	  Theory,	  ed.	  C.	  Laborde	  and	  J.	  Maynor	  (Oxford,	  2008),	  pp.	  83-­‐101	  –	  although,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  positive	  ‘republican’	  theories	  Pettit	  and	  Skinner	  advance	  are	  not	  without	  their	  own	  problems.	  For	  a	  sketch	  of	  what	  an	  adequate	  theory	  of	  liberty	  must	  be	  able	  to	  achieve,	  see	  Bernard	  Williams,	  ‘From	  freedom	  to	  liberty:	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  political	  value’,	  in	  
In	  The	  Beginning	  was	  the	  Deed,	  pp.	  75-­‐96.	  127	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises,	  p.	  328,	  §93.	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Locke’s	  alternative	  to	  Hobbes	  was	  to	  retain	  the	  justificatory	  ambitions	  of	  sovereignty	  theory	  (his	  preference	  was	  to	  speak	  of	  ‘supreme	  power’),	  locating	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  justification	  in	  consent,	  but	  now	  understood	  as	  the	  only	  mechanism	  which	  could	  generate	  legitimate	  relations	  of	  political	  authority	  between	  creatures	  created	  free	  and	  equal,	  and	  which	  took	  the	  place	  of	  Hobbes’s	  theory	  of	  freedom	  embedded	  in	  a	  metaphysic	  of	  matter	  in	  motion,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  the	  normative	  centrality	  of	  consent.128	  Hume	  by	  contrast	  embraced	  secular	  political	  theory	  whilst	  abandoning	  the	  aspiration	  to	  provide	  any	  external	  justificatory	  grounding	  for	  our	  moral	  and	  political	  practices,	  settling	  instead	  for	  their	  internal	  vindication	  by	  the	  light	  of	  the	  opinion	  of	  mankind,	  purposefully	  down-­‐scaled	  from	  the	  ambitions	  of	  Hobbes’s	  vision	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  able	  to	  delineate	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  politics	  understood,	  and	  then	  administered,	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  science.	  For	  Hume,	  a	  proper	  science	  of	  politics	  could	  precisely	  not	  be	  a	  priori,	  and	  the	  crucial	  mistake	  to	  avoid	  was	  the	  putting	  of	  the	  cart	  of	  theory	  before	  the	  horse	  of	  practice,	  appreciating	  instead	  that	  it	  was	  always	  the	  latter	  which	  gave	  any	  worth	  or	  validity	  to	  the	  former.	  Accordingly,	  the	  category	  of	  sovereignty	  was	  redundant	  for	  Hume’s	  purposes.	  In	  political	  practice	  it	  may	  well	  remain	  that	  talk	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  not	  only	  highly	  useful,	  but	  a	  real	  and	  permanent	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  and	  institutional	  make-­‐up	  which	  must	  be	  taken	  account	  of,	  in	  particular	  with	  regards	  to	  identifying	  who	  holds	  (and	  by	  the	  lights	  of	  opinion,	  should	  hold)	  decision-­‐making	  power	  at	  any	  given	  point.	  Insofar	  as	  theory	  aims	  to	  have	  something	  to	  say	  to,	  as	  well	  as	  about,	  practice,	  then	  sovereignty	  will	  remain	  a	  non-­‐eliminable	  and	  central	  category	  of	  modern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  For	  Locke,	  supreme	  power	  must	  be	  vested	  in	  the	  legislature,	  the	  necessary	  check	  to	  judicial	  and	  executive	  power	  liable	  to	  be	  abused	  by	  rulers	  following	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  golden	  age:	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  355-­‐63,	  §134-­‐42.	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politics,	  and	  which	  must	  to	  that	  extent	  be	  taken	  into	  account.129	  Yet	  in	  political	  theory	  prior	  to	  the	  engagement	  of	  practical	  politics	  as	  it	  happens	  to	  be	  given	  by	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  age,	  sovereignty	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  or	  useful	  category	  of	  political	  analysis	  from	  Hume’s	  perspective.	  Who	  is	  or	  is	  not	  thought	  to	  hold	  sovereignty	  in	  any	  given	  time	  and	  place	  is	  determined	  by	  opinion,	  and	  hence	  it	  is	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  opinion	  that	  ought	  properly	  to	  occupy	  our	  philosophical	  attention,	  being	  sensitive	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  can	  and	  do	  change	  as	  human	  circumstances	  alter.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Hume	  ultimately	  offered	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  without	  sovereignty:	  what	  looks	  like	  political	  sociology	  transpires	  to	  be	  an	  attempted	  reconfiguration	  of	  our	  fundamental	  thinking	  about	  what	  organised	  power	  consists	  of	  for	  human	  beings	  in	  what	  Smith	  called	  a	  ‘fatherless’	  world.130	  This	  can	  only	  be	  properly	  appreciated	  if	  we	  simultaneously	  recognise	  the	  seriousness	  of	  Hume’s	  engagement	  with	  political	  obligation.	  In	  turn	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  reconsider	  whether	  a	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  an	  adequate	  theory	  of	  politics,	  or	  whether	  post-­‐Hobbesian	  political	  theory	  can	  get	  by,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  flourish,	  without	  it.131
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  both	  Richard	  Tuck	  and	  Richard	  Bourke	  for	  this	  point,	  though	  both	  will	  likely	  disagree	  with	  the	  ends	  to	  which	  I	  put	  it.	  On	  the	  extreme	  complexity	  of	  sovereignty	  theory	  and	  its	  messy	  interface	  with	  political	  practice,	  in	  particular	  as	  refracted	  through	  the	  French	  Revolution	  as	  a	  central	  event	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  modern	  representative	  republic,	  see	  Istvan	  Hont,	  ‘The	  Permanent	  Crisis	  of	  a	  Divided	  Mankind:	  “Nation-­‐State”	  and	  “Nationalism”	  in	  Historical	  Perspective’,	  in	  Jealousy	  of	  Trade,	  447-­‐528	  –	  although	  it	  should	  be	  observed	  that	  Hont	  notes	  (p.	  487)	  that	  the	  new	  modern	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  forged	  by	  Sieyès	  and	  offered	  to	  the	  French	  revolutionaries	  was	  no	  better	  understood	  by	  the	  principle	  political	  actors	  than	  the	  earlier	  accounts	  of	  Hobbes	  and	  Rousseau	  had	  been	  in	  previous	  generations.	  130	  Smith,	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments,	  p.	  235.	  131	  On	  the	  enormous	  historical,	  as	  well	  as	  theoretical,	  legacy	  of	  sovereignty	  theory	  that	  an	  opinion	  of	  mankind	  idiom	  must	  nonetheless	  reckon	  with,	  see	  Hont,	  ‘Permanent	  Crisis’.	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